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INTRODUCTION
For those of us who do not interpret the first amendment as an ab-
solute prohibition on governmental interference with free expression,
the Supreme Court's failure to articulate its underlying values is a
source of great difficulty. We are left to search not only for a pattern in
the case law, but also for those principles that would identify such a pat-
tern.' Such a search necessarily involves suggestions on how the differ-
ent emerging doctrines about the first amendment may be harmonized.
The Court's treatment of regulations of speech aimed at affecting
* Assisiam! Profcssor. University of South Dakota School of Law. B.A. 1976. J.).
1979 tniversiiy of Arizona; I.I.M. 1983 Northwestern University.
I. This approach is discussed in Redish. The Iabie qf Jm'e Speech. 130 U. PA. .. R.s
591 (1982) hcrecinafier cited as Redish. F'e Speech 1.
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behavior has been puzzling.2 In a series of cases, the Court has consid-
ered whether a state may attempt to control behavior by controlling
speech. One effect of such regulation is to discourage the participants
on one side of the debate. Underlying the state's speech regulation may
be a legitimate interest in discouraging harmful or undesirable activity,
such as drinking, prostitution, smoking, wasteful energy use or ground-
less litigation. At issue here, however, is not the legitimacy of that state
interest, but instead the availability of speech regulation to achieve that
interest, especially when means other than those restricting speech are
available. How far the state may go in regulating speech to affect behav-
ior requires an evaluation of the nature of the regulation and the impor-
tance of the state interest to be furthered.
The first part of this two-part inquiry-that of the nature of the reg-
ulation-focuses on the basis for regulating speech. Apart from discred-
ited attempts to establish the first amendment as an absolute, 3 the
discussion centers on whether there should be one type of analysis for
all regulations of speech or a variety of analyses keyed to the basis for
the regulation, such as the type of speech, speaker, audience and
method of regulation. There has been a proliferation of tests, suggested
distinctions and bases for regulation.
4
One frequently relied upon distinction is that of content-based reg-
ulation and content-neutral regulation. This distinction is premised on
the belief that content-based regulations should be strictly reviewed by
examining the compelling state interest that is purportedly narrowly
served by the regulation, while content-neutral regulations need merely
be reasonable regulations calculated to achieve a nontrivial goal. 5 Thus,
to establish the level of scrutiny to which a particular type of regulation
2. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557 (1980); Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
3553 (1984); Princess Sea Indus. v. State, 635 P.2d 281 (Nev. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
926 (1982). This article's subject is the regulation of harmful and undesirable speech-
speech on which the state has made a substantive value judgment, but which has not been
declared unlawful. For an examination of a state's ability to regulate unlawful speech,
especially when it is also commercial, see Barnes, Unlafutl Commercial Speech: .4 Clear and
Present Danger, 1984 B.Y.U. L. REV. 457.
3. A recurring theme in first amendment theory is that speech should be absolutely
protected. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I
(1971); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245. But even
absolute protection does not prevent speech regulation when it is more than speech. An
example of this regulable speech activity is speech that is, in effect, action. As Justice
Holmes suggested, the shouting of fire in a crowded theater goes beyond speech and can
be regulated. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). More recently, Professor
Farber has suggested that commercial speech has two functions: expression and contract
formation. See Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amiendniewnt Theory', 74 Nw. UL. REXv. 372
(1979). Professor Farber suggets that the contract formation of speech should be regul-
able, while expressions of a commercial nature should be protected like any other category
of speech. Id. at 386-90.
4. See Bork, supra note 3; Redish, The Content Distiictio, in First m.4endment al.ysivs, 34
STAN. .. REV. 113 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Redish, Content Distinction: Stone. Content
Regnlation and the First .imendment. 25 WM. & MARY L. RE'. 189 (1983) 1hereinafter cited as
Stone. Content Regulatioil.
5. See Stone, (:ontent Regulatim. stipra note 4, at 190-97.
[Vol. 63:1
REG ULATION OF SPEECH
will be subjected, the regulation should first be categorized according to
its basis.
The second part of this inquiry requires the identification, with rea-
sonable certainty, of the interest to be furthered and the determination
of whether that interest is legitimate and effectively furthered by the reg-
ulation.6 It is suggested, however, that this portion of the inquiry is in-
adequate because the issue of whether the interest can be achieved by
methods that do not infringe freedom of speech is also important. If the
goal can be achieved by methods that do not infringe on freedom of
speech, the state must choose one of those other methods. When the
state seeks to affect behavior, it should not be allowed to prohibit speech
about an undesirable behavior unless the state first declares that behav-
ior unlawful as well as undesirable.
This article argues that the outer limit of the state's power to regu-
late speech is a function of the existence and strength of the regulation
of the underlying activity. When the underlying activity is prohibited,
the state should be permitted to regulate speech likely to foster the un-
lawful activity. Conversely, when it is merely the judgment of the legis-
lature, the executive, the courts or an administrative agency that the
activity is harmful or undesirable, albeit lawful, speech regulation in-
tended to discourage that activity should not be permitted. Thus, in a
state where liquor sales are prohibited, commercial speech promoting
the sale of liquor may be properly prohibited. 7 However, if a legislature
decided to curb cigarette smoking by banning all advertising, it would
be an impermissible regulation of speech unless the legislature also pro-
hibited cigarette smoking.
To facilitate an understanding of this article's thesis, it will be nec-
essary to review the significant cases and current theories on speech reg-
ulation. From these sources, a two-part test for the application of
heightened scrutiny to state action will be formulated. In the latter half
of this article, this "heightened scrutiny" test will be analyzed to eluci-
date the reasons for requiring states to address the problems of substan-
tive behavior before permitting them to regulate speech as a means of
discouraging undesirable behavior.
I. CONTENT REGULATION
The content of speech has been regulated since the beginning of
constitutional history.8 Despite what many people would like to believe
about the framers' intent as to the first amendment ' the better view is
that first amendment protections were slow to develop. The current
protection of speech is more the result of twentieth century beliefs than
that of libertarian notions universally accepted throughout the nation's
6. See infra notes 226-38 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 263-77 and accompanying text.
8. L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 10-44 (1966).
9. See Chafee, Freedom of Speech in Iftor Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 954-56, 966-69
(1919).
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history. ' 1
Although one may legitimately point to the first "clear and present
danger" case decided by the Supreme Court as the progenitor of the
modern concern for free expression, it was probably more of an affirma-
tion of the ease with which a state may regulate content to further an
important interest. ' One could even begin with the first concise and
clear statement by the Court about the need for content neutrality:
Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not
to mention the first amendment itself, government may not
grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds accepta-
ble, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or
more controversial views. And it may not select which issues
are worth discussing or debating in public facilities. There is
an "equality of status in the field of ideas," and government
must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard
.... Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based
on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to con-
tent alone. 12
Exactly when the modern first amendment doctrine, including the
hostility towards content-specific regulations, emerged is a subject of
controversy. 13 The "revisionist" view of the first amendment, rejecting
a libertarian intent by the framers, was best expressed by Professor
Levy's work. 14 Given the political and social setting of the Bill of Rights
and the first amendment's virtual dormancy until the twentieth century,
it is difficult to refute Professor Levy's view of the first amendment as a
statement of political and legal truths of late eighteenth century cur-
rency that embodied a less than libertarian view of the freedom of
expression. 15
Contemporary scholars have difficulty examining Schenck v. United
10. See Rabban, The Emergence of the Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CI. L. REV.
1205, 1207-13 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Rabban, Emergence].
11. See Chafee, supra note 9, at 966-69.
12. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (quoting A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1948)).
13. Conpare Chafee, supra note 9, at 944-47 with Rabban, The First Amendment in its For-
gotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981). Professor Chafec suggests that justice Holmes' deci-
sion in Schenck was libertarian and began the modern judicial sensitivity toward free speech
protection. while Professor Rabban argues that the "clear and present danger" test of
Schenck was, at the time, mere gloss on the widely held restrictive view of free expression
prevalent at the time. Professor Rabban's view is more appealing, especially in light of the
result in Schenck andJustice Holmes' role as a dissenter in later cases where he supported a
more libertarian view. Professor Rabban also provides an excellent analysis of state and
federal decisions as well as scholarly works from the period preceding World War I, show-
ing that deference toward the protection of free speech was the result of an evoltitionary
process not fairly described as libertarian until many years after the point Professor Chafec
suggests. See Rabban, Eniergence, supra note 10, at 1208-12.
14. L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARI.Y AMERI-
CAN HIsTORY (1960). For authority on equality of opportunity, the Court turned not to its
earlier decisions, but to Alexander Meiklejohn's monograph. POITICAL FREEDOM: TIE
CONSTTrUTIONAL. POWERS OF TIlE PEOPLE (1960). .Iosley, 408 U.S. at 96.
15. See L. LEVY, snIpr note 14, at 2-4.
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States,' the first content regulation case, without leaping to engage the
first amendment debate. This reaction is the result of conditioning by
exposure to this debate over the past twenty to thirty years. However,
arguments based on freedom of expression were not quite as apparent
to either the Court or the lawyers who argued Schenck and the other Es-
pionage Act cases.17
Unfortunately, the better explanations and criticisms of what consti-
tutes content-differential regulation 18 and why it is suspect have come
from commentators instead of the Court. 19 Statements, such as those in
Police Department v. Mosley, 20 which cited a scholar's writings for sup-
port,2 1 are superficial conclusions without explanation or discussion of
the underlying principles. Mosley suggests that restrictions on content
are intuitively offensive to those who believe that the first amendment
creates a protective shell around thought and expression.2 2 The clear
statement of Mosley derives from notions of fundamental equality; a re-
quirement that the government deal evenhandedly with all viewpoints,
instead of any overriding or fundamental principle of freedom of
expression.
2 3
This requirement of equality is, however, inadequate in explaining
why content-differential regulations are subject to heightened scrutiny.
One need look no further than a recent Supreme Court case to see that
complete equality of regulation does not assure a state that its regula-
tion will not be subjected to the stringent "compelling state interest"
test. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission,2 4 the Commis-
sion attempted to prevent in an arguably evenhanded manner all discus-
sion of controversial issues. The Commission argued that the
regulation was a neutral time, place and manner restriction because it
equally disabled all participants in such discussions. The Court, how-
ever, held that the Commission's characterization was an inadequate de-
scription of the regulation's basis. 25 The Court noted that although the
scope of the regulation was neutral because it applied to all viewpoints,
16. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
17. See Rabban, Emergence, supra note 10, at 1247-57.
18. This is not to say that I accept the usefulness of the distinction between content-
neutral and content-specific regulations. My idea, heavily influenced by Professor Redish,
is that the distinction is difficult to make and problematic in application for the same rea-
sons that the time, place, and manner category is not helpful. See infra notes 120-48 and
accompanying text; see aLso Redish, Contet Distinction, supra note 4, at 128-42. For reasons
that will become apparent, the content distinction can easily be abandoned in favor of tests
that establish the degree of damage caused to equality and non-distortion, values which
underlie the heightened scrutiny applied to content-based regulations.
19. Compare Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 4 with Redish, Content Distinction, supra
note 4.
20. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
21. Id. at 96.
22. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, 6-20 (1970):
Meiklejohn, supra note 14, at 19-28; Redish, Free Speech, supra note 1: Stone, Content Regula-
lion, supra note 4.
23. See Moslev, 408 U.S. at 96.
24. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
25. Id. at 537.
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its basis was content-specific because it attempted to delineate those
subjects fit for discussion. 2 6 Because of the absence of a compelling
state interest narrowly served by the regulation, the Court refused to
allow the Commission to dictate what subjects were fit for discussion.
2 7
Thus, the Court applied the same level of scrutiny as it would have ap-
plied if the Commission had attempted to designate the correct view-
point on a particular issue.
2 8
Professor Stone has sought to justify content distinction without
oversimplifying the factors determinifng whether the regulation is con-
tent-differential. 29 Professor Stone has suggested that government reg-
ulation may be broadly classified as content-neutral or content-based. 30
The challenge as he sees it is to choose between the clarity of simplifica-
tion and the bewilderment of a system complex enough to distinguish
between ambiguous restrictions that may be either content-neutral or
content-based. 3 ' He is willing to impose the stringent "strict scrutiny"
test, even to what he terms "modest viewpoint-based restrictions."
3 2
These restrictions are triggered by viewpoint, but limit only the time,
place and manner of expression of a viewpoint. 33 An example of such a
restriction is the ordinance in Linmark Associates v. Township of Wil-
lingboro,34 that prohibited the use of "for sale" signs in an attempt to
stop the flight of white landowners out of neighborhoods where integra-
tion appeared to be taking place. 3 5 He suggests four possible explana-
tions for applying the stringent content-differential analysis in these
modest viewpoint-based restrictions: equality, communicative impact,
distortion of the debate and motivation.
3 6
Professor Stone does an admirable job of refocusing the question
on the underlying bases for regulation, instead of perpetuating the ru-
brics of content-based and time, place and manner restrictions. 3 7 His
purpose, however, is not to suggest a scheme by which all regulations
may be classified to determine what level of scrutiny would be appropri-
ate. Instead, he offers explanations for why content distinctions are par-
ticularly suspect and the bases for determining whether an ambiguous
regulation raises the same type of concern. 3
8
Out of Professor Stone's thorough examination of the origins and
theory of the content/neutrality distinction emerges an analytical struc-
26. See id. at 535-37.
27. Id. at 537-38.
28. Id. at 540-43.
29. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 4; Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Con-
tent: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Akatter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81 (1978) 1hereinafter
cited as Stone, Subject-Alatter Restrictions].
30. Stone, Subject-Alatter Restmictions, supra note 29, at 81-82.
31. See Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 4, at 251-52.
32. Id. at 200-07.
33. Id. at 200.
34. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
35. Id. at 87-88.
36. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 4, at 201-33.
37. Id. at 197-233.
38. Id. at 233-51.
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ture that does not suggest any particular substantive result. His frame-
work of analysis furnishes but a starting point for this article's analysis of
speech regulation. The analysis here diverges from Stone's analytical
framework by combining and modifying his four explanations and sev-
eral bases of regulation into six bases of regulation: (1) con-
tent/viewpoint, (2) content/subject matter, (3) identity of speaker,
(4) identity of audience, (5) efficacy of speech, and (6) time, place and
manner. Each basis will be examined to determine what damage, if any,
occurs to those values that are typically injured by content-specific regu-
lations. When damage to such values is found, it will be argued that the
regulation should be scrutinized in a similarly stringent manner.
Initially, an illustration of content regulation will provide the focal
point for an inquiry into why such a basis for regulation is particularly
suspect. After identifying the values damaged by content regulation,
similar inquiries for each of the remaining bases of regulation shall be
conducted. After all the argumentative elements are in place, the analy-
sis will focus on the question of why speech restrictions intended to curb
undesirable conduct should be subject to the "compelling state interest"
test.
Suppose the legislature wishes to curb the drinking of liquor. The
direct route is to prohibit the sale, possession and consumption of li-
quor (the prohibition route). If this direct regulation is politically unfea-
sible, is there an indirect route to the goal? If the legislature is satisfied
with fewer drinkers or less liquor being sold, it could launch its own
campaign to discourage use (the reformation route). Finally, if the legis-
lature is satisfied with fewer drinkers and less liquor being sold, but is
unwilling to spend the money for the reformation route, the legislature
can discourage the activity by imposing regulations on the availability of
liquor or on the quality and quantity of advertising and other types of
speech relating to liquor and drinking (the regulation approach).
In this hypothetical, liquor has been identified as a harmful or unde-
sirable product, the use of which the state would like to suppress by
what, in the abstract, would appear to be a legitimate action in the inter-
est of the health and welfare of the general populace. Although the con-
trol of liquor sales is paternalistic in character, the Supreme Court has
traditionally deferred to state interests associated with such regula-
tion. 3 9 For purposes of the first amendment, liquor control becomes
controversial only when a state chooses a regulatory approach restrict-
ing the quality or quantity of speech about liquor sales and
consumption.
Although speech regulation relating to liquor sales and consump-
tion is content-based, such is not the case with other types of speech
regulation. For example, a legislative prohibition on all advertising on
highway billboards is a neutral regulation because it equally affects all
39. See Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 743-45.
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messages and subjects. Such a regulation, however, would be content-
based if it prohibited all promotional advertising of alcoholic beverages.
To understand why content-specific regulations are especially sus-
pect and disfavored, the particular evils associated with these regula-
tions must be examined. Viewpoint-oriented regulations damage
several preferred values, such as equality and freedom from distortion in
the "marketplace of ideas" (nondistortion).40 When government regula-
tions affect the substance of the debate, some viewpoint will suffer une-
qual treatment and the audience will receive a distorted version of the
debate. As will be discussed, 4 1 equality is inadequate as a core principle
of first amendment theory. Equality, however, is a useful factor in deter-
mining when heightened scrutiny should be applied. The strongest crit-
icism of equality as a useful tool stems from its failure to extend to
regulations that evenhandedly restrict all speech. This criticism may be
negated through the addition of a nondistortion factor and the limita-
tion that this combination be applied only to identify when heightened
scrutiny may be appropriate.
To determine the utility of the factors of equality4 2 and nondistor-
tion, they should be applied to content-based restrictions to determine
whether they adequately explain the intuitive distaste associated with
content-based regulations. If those two factors are explanatory, it re-
mains to be determined whether their use is consistent with those first
principles that underlie the first amendment. As will be discussed, the
question of whether or not equality and nondistortion are perfect pro-
tectors of a particular first principle is at present irrelevant because
these factors are not intended as competitive entries in that debate.
Rather, they are intended to explain why some restrictions should be
subjected to heightened scrutiny regardless of which first principle is
adopted. Prior to an analysis of viewpoint restrictions and their differ-
ences with the five other suggested bases, a review of the competing first
principles is necessary. It should be remembered that the proposed ba-
ses are but supplements to first principles; factors to be used only to test
for heightened scrutiny in the application of any first principle.
II. COMPETING FIRST PRINCIPLES AND WHY CONTENT REGULATION
VIOLATES THEM
In attempting to delineate the limits of free expression, the Court
has often neglected to set forth the principles underlying its choice of
limitations. Therefore, numerous legal scholars have undertaken the
task of explaining the Court's reasoning. Professor Karst has developed
an analysis of the first amendment doctrine that uses equality as the cen-
40. See .losley, 408 U.S. at 96.
41. See i'fra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
42. Equality and neutrality will be used interchangably. What they require is uniforn-
ity and evenhandness in the regulation of speech. To restrict speakers of one viewpoint in




tral principle. 43 Establishing equality as the central concern has appeal
and is supported by cases such as IMosley. Few would quarrel with the
assertion that a state should not be allowed to treat speakers differently
because of their views. To do so allows the state to foster those views it
deems desirable, while discouraging undesirable views. However, there
has been no explanation of why this should be the rule, even though it
admirably explains many of the Court's decisions.
There are three major competing first amendment models that do
more than simply justify the results in prior cases: the "marketplace of
ideas" model, the "democratic process" model and the "liberty" (self-
realization) model. 4 4 Each model provides a first principle, which in
turn generates rules for application in individual cases. All three models
are dependent on either the free competition of ideas or the abilities of
speakers and their audience to freely communicate to promote either
the democratic process or individual self-realization.
4 5
In criticizing Professor Karst's narrowing of first amendment princi-
ples on equality, Professor Redish, a proponent of the liberty model,
correctly points out that equality would exist in a regulation that prohib-
ited all expression. 4 6 However, such a regulation, no matter how nar-
rowly conceived, would be highly offensive to first amendment
principles. For this reason, concern about equality alone does not ex-
plain why content and subject-matter differential regulations are sub-
jected to heightened scrutiny. Although helpful, equality, as now
conceived, seems inadequate to serve as a first principle.
In the "marketplace of ideas" model, the first amendment is a posi-
tive statement that truth will eventually defeat falsity. Governmcnt reg-
ulation should be permitted only when substantive evil is so clear and
imminent that there is no opportunity for the marketplace to work. 4 7
Under this view, content regulation distorts the marketplace. Inequality
in regulation is seen as undesirable not because of an independent inter-
est in equality, but because inequality distorts the marketplace.
Those who espouse the democratic process value are also con-
cerned about equality. The model is based on the first principle that an
enlightened and informed citizenry is needed for the proper functioning
of democratic institutions. 48 Therefore, to the extent that free expres-
sion does not foster the democratic process, speech may be abridged
with impunit. 4 '1 However, within this more narrow scope of free
speech, any inequality in governmental regulation of speech damages
the first principle because such regulation lessens the probability that
the electorate will be sufficiently and accurately informed to act demo-
43. Karst, EqualitY as a Central Principle in the First Amendment. 43 U. Ciii. L. RE\'. 20
(1975).
44. Redish, Content Distinction, supra note 4, at 136.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 136-37.
47. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis. J.. concurring).
48. Redish, Content Distinction, supra note 4, at 193-94.
49. Bork, supra note 3, at 20.
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cratically. 50 Similarly, any distortion of debate would seem to be inimi-
cal to the democratic process because it would not be an accurate
reflection of the opinions of the democracy's citizens.
More recently, the "liberty" model has suggested that the first prin-
ciple is self-realization. 5 1 The model rejects the democratic process
value as too narrow a conception of the first amendment's purpose. The
constitution's protection of free expression is characterized as a concern
for the maturation and fulfillment of the individual, which is derived in
part from the process of decision-making. 52 Although nonpolitical
speech that contributes to individual growth is beneficial because a ma-
ture and informed polity is desirable, 53 "[t]here is, however, more to
self-realization than private self-government."
54
Under the "liberty" model, the ultimate value of free speech is that
it fosters self-realization, which is considered to be the instrumental
value of democracy. 5 5 With this broad value underlying the "liberty"
model, any interference through inequality of regulation or distortion of
debate inhibits the realization of each individual's potential. Thus, con-
tent regulation is inconsistent with the "liberty" model because the dual
effects of inequality and distortion of debate inhibit self-realization.
In order to avoid reconsidering the merits of these competing mod-
els, this article will attempt to establish why content-differential regula-
tion of speech has been viewed by the Court as inimical to first
amendment interests. After identifying the interests damaged by con-
tent regulation, the five other bases of regulation will be tested to deter-
mine whether regulations bottomed on these other bases damage first
amendment interests in the same way. Thus, the archetype of content
regulation based upon viewpoint will serve as a pattern for establishing
when strict scrutiny should be applied. It will be argued that the equal-
ity and nondistortion interests are damaged when the basis of speech
regulation is the subject matter, the identity of the speaker, the identity
of the audience or the efficacy of the speech, but are not damaged by
regulations based on time, place and manner of expression.
It will be unnecessary to choose among competing first principles
because the distillation of the interests damaged by content-specific reg-
ulations produces the neutrality and nondistortion interests. It seems
apparent that damage to these interests is inimical to all three first prin-
ciples, thereby producing a test that does not require the Court to adopt
one of the competing core values before it can coherently and consist-
ently determine whether strict scrutiny should be applied. When the
principles of nondistortion or neutrality are violated, strict scrutiny
should be the standard.
50. Id. at 26-27.
51. See Redish, Free Speech, supra note 1, at 622-28.
52. Id. at 605-07.
53. See id. at 630-45.
54. Id. at 627.
55. Id. at 601-05.
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Whichever core value is preferred, government regulation of view-
point is undesirable and damaging because it damages the political pro-
cess by distorting debate and preventing the communication of ideas,
both of which are necessary for the maintenance of a democratic soci-
ety. 5" Content-differential regulations damage the "marketplace of
ideas" model by distorting debate, creating a false market and artificially
dictating the appeal of ideas. Similarly, content regulation is inconsis-
tent with the self-realization value because when viewpoints are dictated,
an individual is not free to communicate restricted views. Thus, intellec-
tual maturity and other types of self-realization are not attainable be-
cause there is no possibility for expression that generates agreement or
criticism and little opportunity for the individual to learn from opinions
responding to that individual's views. Therefore, content-specific regu-
lations must be viewed as being particularly odious.
5 7
In the following section, the evils present in content regulation that
cause it to be unacceptable will be discussed. The discussion will then
examine the evils in content-neutral regulations to determine whether
such regulations should also be subjected to the "compelling state inter-
est" test, which is applied when a regulation is content-specific.
III. REGULATIONS MAY BE CATEGORIZED BY THE BASIS
FOR THE RESTRICTION
Regulation of speech may take many forms, although there are a
finite number of bases for these forms. This finite number of bases pro-
vides guidelines for determining whether harmful or undesirable speech
is content-neutral or content-based. These bases also are essential to a
coherent analysis of when content-specific regulation may be justified.
One basis of regulation is the content of the message or the view-
point it communicates. Another basis for regulation is the subject mat-
ter of the message. Both of these bases involve the regulation of
content. Other bases may also effectively restrict viewpoint, but do so in
a content-neutral manner, such as regulations that restrict particular
speakers or restrict access to particular audiences. Further, there are
some speech regulations, such as those based on time, place and manner
or the efficacy of the communication, 58 that appear to be content-neu-
56. Professor Stone applies some of the explanations to various bases for regulation.
such as the identity of the speaker, the identity of the audience, the subject matter and the
communicative impact of the speech. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 4, at 234-50. By
examining these ambiguous bases, Professor Stone shows how they may. in some cases,
have a differential effect on content, even when there is no direct relationship to the con-
tent. Professor Stone's purpose is to show that there is merit in the content distinction.
but that this distinction should not be oversimplified. Id. at 251-52.
57. Content regulation is not wholly insupportable. There are times when nothing
less than the prevention ofa particular type of communication will insure the preservation
of a competing and compelling value. [he classic example is words that have the effect of
physical action. Falsely shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre was the example given b%
,Justice Holmes. S(helk 71. lUnited States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The state should be able
to preserve the health and safety of its citizens by outlawing this type of speech, even
punishing it with criminal sanctions when it occurs.
58. What I have chosen to call "'elticacy of'the communication" may be what Professor
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tral and can only be classed as content-specific when their interaction
with extrinsic facts produces an incidental, yet effective restriction on
content.
A. Content Regulation by Restriction Based on Viewpoint
The Espionage Act cases address the issue of the regulation of view-
point. In Schenck v. United States,59 the defendant was convicted of
wilfully conspiring to have printed and circulated to draftees a docu-
ment intended to cause insubordination and the obstruction of the draft
process. 60 In upholding Schenck's conviction, the Supreme Court
stated that the document would not have been sent had it not been in-
tended to have the effect of influencing inductees to obstruct the draft.6 '
Although the Court's characterization of Schenck's rather mild exhorta-
tion as "impassioned" is certainly an overstatement, it adds to the
strength of the Court's conclusion that Schenck had violated the Espio-
nage Act.
62
Although Justice Holmes introduced the phrase "clear and present
danger" because of the context of the phrase and the factual setting,
Schenck did not announce a deferential attitude toward first amendment
concerns. 6 3 Schenck's call for obstruction did not specify any time for
action, 64 nor had Schenck any way of gauging his audience's reaction
and fueling any positive response. In this sense there was no immediate
threat, but instead merely an abstract advocacy calling for action at some
indeterminate future time. Justice Holmes recognized this weakness in
the government's case, but remedied it by supplying the Court's conclu-
sion about the intended effect. 65 By inferring the intended effect, the
opinion has much in common with the "bad tendency" test of prior
cases and may not fairly be read as deferential toward free expression.
6 6
Instead of being a model of clear libertarian thinking, Schenck is
more fairly viewed as a continuation of long-held beliefs that, although
the first amendment did grant substantive rights, important state inter-
ests are at least as important as the liberty interest of individuals in free
expression. Schenck manifests an easy acceptance of the state's interest
in perpetuation, especially when threatened in wartime. Thus, circum-
stance and context are important in determining the protection given
freedom of speech.
6 7
The mark of a content-based restriction is the failure of the state to
remain neutral. This is the first evil inherent in content-based restric-
Stone rel'ers to as the -communicative impact." Stone, Content Regulalion, suprn note 4, at
234-39.
59. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
60. Id. at 49.
61. It. at 51.
62. Id. at 51-52.
63. Id. See also Rabban. Etiep'ence, supra note 10, at 1259-60.
64. Schenrk, 249 U.S. at 51.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 51-52. See also Rabban. Emergen'e, supa note 10, at 1259-62.
67. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
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tions. A more recent example of such regulation is the "clear and pres-
ent danger" case of Brandenburg v. Ohio.68 Brandenburg, the leader of a
Ku Klux Klan group, was convicted under Ohio's criminal syndicalism
statute of advocating violence or terrorism as a means of accomplishing
political reform. 61 Instead of asking whether the threat was clear and
present, the Court asked whether the "advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action."
70
The first amendment, its scope established by whatever value is
chosen, is concerned with the protection of an individual's right to com-
municate a point of view. There is a fine line between advocacy and
incitement. Content-specific or viewpoint-based regulations are particu-
larly offensive 7 ' because they can be used on both sides of the line to
stifle self-realization as well as protect order. Individuals whose intellec-
tual growth depends on the expression of views currently not acceptable
to the government may find themselves punished in the name of or-
dered liberty.
It has been suggested quite reasonably that it is not merely the
quantity of communication, but also its lack of distortion that furthers
both the "democratic process" and "self-realization" values. 72 The
proposition that a democratic society that stifles any one viewpoint dam-
ages the system by reducing the probability of informed democratic
choices is both intuitively appealing and inherently logical. Although
there is no assurance that more information and discussion will result in
"better" decisions, it is generally accepted that limiting participation in
a debate is certain to reduce the probability of receiving all the informa-
tion needed to make the "best" choice. Similarly, content regulation
limits the probability of self-realization when a part of a person's intel-
lectual growth is dependent upon expressing a prohibited or unpopular
viewpoint.
For these reasons and those previously discussed, content-specific
regulations of speech are disfavored because of their inequality and dis-
tortive effects. Prior to Schenck and Professor Chafee's rather loose and
optimistic reading of it, there was little basis for a libertarian view of the
first amendment. The attempts of constitutional scholars to build a co-
herent theory of freedom of expression have not been based on funda-
mental principles established by the framers, but rather on their own
68. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
69. Id. at 444-45.
70. Id. at 447. At least one commentator has suggested that this is a new test. but the
practical difference between this and "clear and present danger." if any. has vet to he
explicated by the Court. See Comment, Brandenburg v. Ohio: .1 Speech Tesifin .II Seasons?,
43 U. Cii. L.. RFS. 151, 187-90 (1975).
71. See stpra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
72. As to the self'realization value, Professor Redish has suggested that the market-
pla(e-of-ideas concept is deficient becatse there is not assurance that ituth will %in oi .
Nevertheless, without protection for expression of viewpoints that are unpoptlar lh
chance Cbr sell-realization is reduced. See Redish. Fiee Speech. suprct mite 1. at 616-18
(1982).
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opinions, as ad hoc judges, of when the state has gone too far in regulat-
ing speech. 73 The "clear and present danger" test was not a practical
application of theory. That is why examples of theory or formulations of
policy stand out in the reading of first amendment cases, such as in the
previously-quoted language of Mosley.7 4 It is no coincidence that as au-
thority for a libertarian conception of the first amendment, the Court in
Mosley did not quote prior cases, but instead quoted a legal scholar at-
tempting to set forth a general theory of freedom of expression. This
libertarian approach disregards the concern for context and the limita-
tion on freedom of speech found in Schenck. 7 5 Mosley replaces these con-
cerns with the assumption that the first amendment is a positive
statement that the state shall not interfere except in certain extraordi-
nary situations and that any interference must be evenhanded and unre-
lated to viewpoint. 7 6 Thus, what should be sought in examining the
other possible bases for speech regulation is a congruence; a symmetry
as to deleterious effects that should prompt the same reaction. When
regulations affecting time, place and manner damage values inherent in
freedom of expression to the same extent as content regulation, the
Court should be prepared to treat these regulations as equally suspect,
despite traditional judicial and scholarly deference toward them. Con-
versely, when a regulation focuses on content or viewpoint but is justi-
fied by a legitimate state interest as important as that underlying the
"clear and present danger" test, speech regulation should be permitted.
B. Content Regulation by Restrictions Based on Subject Matter
This classification represents a basis for regulation different from
simple viewpoint regulation. Although it is regulation based on the con-
tent of speech, it is not necessarily viewpoint sensitive. 77 Professor
Stone has suggested that there are two categories of subject-matter re-
strictions.7 8 The first is a restriction directed at broad classes of speech.
An example of this first type is the restriction in Mosley because it re-
stricted all types of speech other than speech about labor relations. 7 '
The second type of subject-matter classification is comprised of restric-
tions directed at a specific issue or a cluster of issues forming only one
class of speech."" An example of this type of restriction is found in Leh-
man v. City of Shaker Heights8 in which the city sought to prohibit all paid
political advertising in the cars of the city's rapid transit system.
8 2
Professor Stone does not reach a conclusion as to how these types
73. Id. at 591. Commentators, however. have not adequately considered "first princi-
plCS." Id.
74. See sipia note 12 and accompanying text.
75. Compare Mosl'rv, 408 U.S. at 96 with Scheck, 249 U.S. at 51-52.
76. .Iose v. 408 U.S. at 96.
77. Stone, Subjec-.Italfer Restrictio,. supra note 29, at 83.
78. Id. at 109-13.
79. Mloa, 408 U.S. at 95.
80. Stolle, S qjeil-.tlJail'r Rest)iriso, stt.. r ia note 29. at 112.
81. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
82. Id. at 299-300.
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of restrictions should be treated in all cases, but suggests that the sec-
ond type of restriction be treated in the same manner as a viewpoint
regulation for consistency and ease of administration as well as for the
promotion of a consistent first amendment doctrine. 8 3 It is also sug-
gested that the first category of broader-based subject-matter restric-
tions be treated in the same manner as viewpoint neutral restrictions.
8 4
An example of subject-matter regulation is the restriction chal-
lenged in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission.85 The Com-
mission refused to permit a public interest group to insert in utility bills
a rebuttal to Consolidated Edison's earlier pro-nuclear power insert.
The Commission also adopted a regulation barring utility companies
from including inserts expressing opinions on controversial issues of
public policy. 86
The Commission candidly defended the regulation as acceptable
because it permitted consumers to receive useful information while pro-
tecting their "privacy" by prohibiting less useful controversial communi-
cation. 8 7 Because the ban applied to all discussion of controversial
issues, the Commission argued that it was a neutral subject-matter regu-
lation instead of a viewpoint sensitive regulation and, therefore, was en-
titled to judicial deference. 8 8 These arguments were rejected by the
Court because neither justification overcame the first amendment's hos-
tility towards content regulation, which extends not only to restrictions
on particular viewpoints but also to prohibitions of all discussion of a
topic. 8 9 This stance by the Court seems remarkably protective and even
inconsistent with the other cases in which the Court has upheld regula-
tions limiting public debate of particular subjects.90 The Court recog-
nized that a flat rule prohibiting subject-matter regulation was
inappropriate because of the inadequacy of competing state interests of-
fered to justify such regulations. 9 1 The Court supported its rejection of
a flat prohibition by noting the lesser protection given certain categories
83. Stone, Subject-M fatter Restrictions, supra note 29, at 113-15.
84. Id. This is a simplification of Professor Stone's views, but in the remainder of this
section his reasoning will be expanded upon as ideas are added. Additional ideas will later
be needed to complete the analysis of harmful speech and the proposed standard of review
in viewpoint sensitive cases.
85. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
86. Id. at 532-33.
87. Id. at 537.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 537-38.
90. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock. 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Lehman v. Shaker Heights. 418 U.S.
298 (1974).
91. See C(osolidated Edion, 447 U.S. at 538. It is important that the Court establish
with reasonable certainty the state interest being served by the regulation. To fail would
permit the state to abridge freedom of spech by positing an interest 
served by a regula-
tion, but which is only indirectly or inadequately served by the chosen method of regnla-
tion. This point may be illustrated by comparing the cases of lehman v. Shaker Heights,
4 18 U.S. 298 (1974) aind Meti rouiediai. Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). Ii Le/nu
the restriction on political advertising in transit system cars was the result of solicitous
concern for passengCrS who. as captives for the duration of the ride, were frced to elidt'c
advertising. lehi,,. 418 U.S. at 303-04, 318 (BrennaiJ., dissenting), The city of San
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of speech such as obscenity, fighting words and commercial speech.'92
In rejecting the Commission's claim that Supreme Court precedent
supported subject-matter regulation, the Court cited two cases that are
not within one of the categories of speech that the Court has declared to
have a lower level of protection. Those two cases were Greer v. Spock 113
and Lehman v. Shaker Heights.94 The Court distinguished them as cases in
which validation of the regulation was dependent upon the govern-
ment's special interest "in overseeing the use of its property.' '1 5 The
Court then returned to the simple proposition that government regula-
tion of the viewpoint or subject matter of speech may be sustained only
when the regulation is a precise means of serving a compelling state
interest.9 6 Thus, the Court concluded that the Commission was unable
to show either a compelling state interest or that the regulation was suf-
ficiently narrow
9 7
Although the Court may be comfortable with its distinction between
the Commission's regulation and the restriction upheld in Lehman and
Diego in Metromedia limited billboard advertising in the interest of aesthetics and highway
safety. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 493.
The two results are inconsistent if one discounts the importance of the Court's con-
cern about the creation of a public forum in Lehman. No first amendment forum was found
to exist by virtue of acceptance of some advertising. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303-304. Be-
cause the city acted in a propriety capacity, the transit system was free to make reasonable
choices concerning the type of advertisement accepted so long as it did not interfere with
the general public's convenience and safety. Id. In the absence of this concern about the
proprietary nature of the state enterprise and the question of whether a public forum was
created, the result is at odds with Metromedia. Both regulations limited the opportunities
for speech about non-commercial topics. San Diego banned non-commercial billboards,
AMetromedia, 453 U.S. at 493-95, while Shaker Heights banned political advertising, Lehman,
418 U.S. at 300.
The plurality opinion of Metromedia critically examined the proffered state interests of
aesthetics and safety, found them to be legitimate, and recognized that those interests
were damaged by the billboards permitted by the regulation. Because of this inference
that communicative interest and value surpassed the interests in aesthetics and safety, the
state could not legitimately determine acceptability based on content. Once the Court
established that the state's interest in safety and aesthetics did not outweigh the individ-
ual's interest in communication in all circumstances, it became apparent that prohibition
of certain billboards was based on the state's value judgment of the worth of the subject
matter, thereby violating first amendment principles. See Aletromedia, 453 U.S. at 519-21.
In contrast, the plurality in Lehman allowed the state to discriminate between advertis-
ing despite the concession that the communicative interest of some advertising out-
weighed the individual's interest in being left alone and unperturbed during the ride.
Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303-04; see also id. at 318-20 (Brennan, J.. dissenting).
The result of .letr6inedia is more easily justified than that of Lehman. The interest in
Lehman was established as the protection of the sensibilities and privacy of the public. This
should have led to the conclusion that it was impermissible to choose among types of
advertising by eliminating some, but not all, because such discrimination would require a
substantive evaluation of the worth of the advertising and a balancing of that worth against
the interest in not being disturbed. This type of choice is a violation of both the equality
and non-distortion principles because the state judges the value of the speech and enters
the debate to ensure that its selected value is fturthered by prohibiting the communication
ol disfavored subjects or viewpoints.
92. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 538 n.5.
93. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
94. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
95. Consolidated Ediso,. 447 U.S. at 539-40.
96. Id. at 540.
97. Id. at 540-43.
[Vol. 63:1
REGULATION OF SPEECH
Greer, such a distinction does not promote a coherent and consistent the-
ory of speech regulation. This is not to say that the restriction can not
be justified, only that it should be justified on other principles. Such a
justification might proceed along this line. These regulations are funda-
mentally at odds with the first amendment's concern for free expression
because they distort the public debate by preventing communication of
a viewpoint or by limiting its effect. They also allow the government to
control the debate in an unequal manner by permitting preferred views
to be heard while less favored views are selectively restricted. This pat-
tern of inequality and distortion is inconsistent with both the "market-
place of ideas" and "democratic process" values because both these
values rely on the availability of equal access to participants in debates
about public issues. 98 For those who see the first amendment as further-
ing self-realization, content-based regulations obstruct the process of in-
tellectual maturation and self-realization. By skewing the debate, these
regulations remove an opportunity for self-growth where it is dependent
upon expression of unpopular or undesirable topics.
Subject-matter restrictions are less obviously destructive of the
equality and nondistortion interests than direct regulation of view-
points. 99 Although a case may be made that subject-matter restrictions
do not distort the debate because they evenhandedly restrict all speech,
this ignores its greater effect on dissenters. If the group in power in a
democratic society can prevent all debate on issues that may cause a shift
in power, that group will likely be able to maintain its power. Although
subject-matter restrictions do not present the problem of government
distortion by directly hindering the debate, they do indirectly distort the
debate by leaving without a forum those who would seek change in the
restricted subject area. Granted, those wishing to laud the status quo
will also be hindered, yet their substantive view will probably prevail
while those who seek change are dissenters without a voice. Thus, these
restrictions are protective of the status quo and damage both the "mar-
ketplace of ideas" and "democratic process" models. If the govern-
ment's interest is to maintain the status quo, it may further this interest
by using subject-matter restrictions to affect a de facto distortion of the
discussion and discriminate against selected viewpoints.
For those who find a self-realization value at the core of the first
amendment, the distinction between viewpoint and subject-matter re-
98. Because the democratic process model would limit protection to those issues valu-
able in making decisions that are part of the democratic process of self-government, the
scope of protection for subject matter may arguably be narrower. Bork. supra note 3. at
20-21. Within this narrower scope. however. inequality and distortion would be as harm-
ful to the protected process.
99. Professor Stone has written that these types of restrictions appear superficially to
be less dangerous and could be reviewed under a test other than the "compelling state
interest" test. Although he does not positively state a rule. his preference appears to be
that, on close examination, the surf ice appeal of the argument for a less rigorous test
should yield to i consistent and iiiore casily administered across-the-board application of
the "'compelling state interest" test in all coiltent-based restrictionis, including subject-
mailer regulations. See Stoie., Sl t)jet-,llla er Retrictio, s..upr(i note 29, at 108-14.
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strictions is unacceptable. Both damage a person's efforts to develop
through self-expression. Viewpoint restrictions hinder personal devel-
opment by preventing a person from expressing a chosen view.
Although the effect of subject-matter restrictions on personal develop-
ment may be less inimical to a person's integrity, such restrictions are far
more damaging because they remove all opportunities for discussion in
the subject area covered by the prohibition. Trading viewpoint restric-
tions for subject-matter restrictions is merely the trading of qualitatively
invasive restrictions for quantitatively invasive restrictions.' 0 0  It is
rather like being told: the good news is we no longer prohibit criticism
of governmental policy, the bad news is you are not allowed to discuss it
at all.
Application of these principles to the Court's decision in Consolidated
Edison inexorably leads to the conclusion that the Court was correct in
invalidating the Commission's regulation. Subject-matter restrictions
such as those in Consolidated Edison are sufficiently similar to viewpoint
regulations in the amount and quality of damage done to first amend-
ment values that the "compelling state interest" test should be applied
by the courts. 10
Instead of elucidating the underlying value or values of the first
amendment, the Court in Consolidated Edison established the rule that:
"[w]here a government restricts the speech of a private person, the state
action may be sustained only if the government can show that the regu-
lation is a precisely drawn means of serving a compelling state inter-
est."' 1 2 What is missing, however, is an explanation of why this is the
standard. In the absence of an explanation of the basis for this rule, it is
difficult to predict when that rule will be applied. As Justice Stevens
pointed out in his concurrence, any student of history or the Court
knows that unequivocal rules about content and viewpoint neutrality
are, at least, part hyperbole.10 3 What is needed from the Court is its
reasoning for subjecting this particular subject-matter restriction to the
"compelling state interest" test. However, the Court's conclusion may
be reached by applying factors that do not require the adoption of a first
principle. Although a comparison of the values damaged by content
regulation with those values damaged by subject-matter restrictions is
an admittedly conservative approach, it has the virtue of adding an ana-
lytical tool that is flexible enough to be adapted to a wide variety of
principles.
C. Content Regulation by Restrictions Based on the Efficacy of the Speech
This article has to this point suggested that two concerns, inequality
and distortive impact, explain why viewpoint or content-based restric-
tions are of particular concern. Professor Stone has divided into four
100. See Rcdish, Conlenit Dislinction, supra now 4. at 130-39.
101. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 540.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 544-45 (Sievens, J.. concurring).
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categories the explanations of why content-based restrictions are disfa-
vored: (1) neutrality; (2) communicative impact; (3) distortion of public
debate; and, (4) motivation. 10 4 Of the four, the first three are readily
recognizable reformulations or variations of the previously discussed
"equality"' 0 5 and "marketplace of ideas" values.
Motivation is a possible separate basis for invalidating speech re-
strictions, but it seems inseparable from the objective explanatory inter-
ests of neutrality and nondistortion. If a regulation affects either of
these two interests, it is superfluous and problematic to ask about im-
proper motivation as a separate basis for invalidation. Establishing mo-
tivation is difficult. Moreover, it would not be wise to introduce
subjective factors such as motivation into a first amendment analysis
when objective factors such as those of equality and nondistortion are
sufficient to establish the impropriety of a regulation. Therefore, elimi-
nation of motivation as a basis for distinguishing between content-based
and content-neutral regulations is desirable.
Professor Stone's reason for including communicative impact as an
explanation for the content-neutral/content-based distinction is less
readily apparent. Professor Stone seems to believe that this explanation
has three sub-categories. Communicative impact can be the basis for
regulation when speech is regulated because of concern that the speech
will be persuasive, prompt an adverse reaction, or affect other activities
by having a strong disruptive effect.' 0 6 He concludes that the first justi-
fication is the same type of paternalistic interest that is unacceptable
when viewpoints are regulated.' 0 7 Similarly, concern about the "com-
municative impact" of offensive or controversial speech is unjustifiable
as a paternalistic interference with what is said in the public debate. 10 8
The disruptive impact subcategory covers speech regulation be-
cause its message is particularly distracting or disruptive.' 10  Professor
Stone is tentatively reassured that this also should be treated as an ille-
gitimate basis in many instances because it again rests on paternalistic
concerns over offensive content. However, he is not convinced that
these restrictions are inherently invalid when they are unrelated to the
presumed offensiveness because they may rest on legitimate concerns
that are not paternalistic or reactive to intolerance.' 10
Professor Stone does not suggest it, but it seems that the communi-
cative impact explanation can be subsumed by the equality and distor-
tion of debate categories. All regulations that are the result of
paternalistic concerns over acceptance are viewpoint differential and
104. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 4, at 200-27.
105. Some first amendment scholars have emphasized the importance of equality in the
first amendment doctrine. See Karst, supra note 43. But see Redish, Content Distinction., supra
note 4, at 134-39.
106. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 4, at 212-16.
107. Id. at 212-14.
108. Id. at 215-16.
109. Id. at 216.
110. Id. at 216-17.
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are, at the least, distortive of the debate. Those regulations that are
concerned with some reaction other than acceptance should properly be
treated not as content regulation but as restrictions based on the efficacy
of speech because it is the reaction to the speech that prompts the re-
striction. Although he does not propose that efficacy of speech restric-
tions be included within the two values of nondistortion and neutrality
and treated in the same manner as content-specific restrictions, his anal-
ysis is helpful in understanding why this should be the case. A restric-
tion based on acceptance is a paternalistic attempt to distort the debate
or may even seek to impose the view favored by the state. It is a restric-
tion that is content-based, but that focuses upon the reaction to the dis-
favored view instead of upon the viewpoint. I11 If the restriction is based
on paternalistic concern for the reaction to offensive speech, it is just as
undesirable because of its distortive effect.' 12
Professor Stone suggests that the third type of restriction-regula-
tions of speech having distractive or disruptive qualities that are not
prompted by concerns about acceptance or offensiveness-is a "vanish-
ingly small" category.' 13 1 would agree and go further to suggest that
this classification adds little to the analytical scheme because regulations
related to the efficacy of this type of speech can be subsumed by either
the equality or distortion of debate categories or may reasonably be clas-
sified as time, place and manner restrictions unrelated to effect or
efficacy.
An example of this atypical restriction would be a city ordinance
prohibiting any demonstration or meeting in the vicinity of a school that
is reasonably calculated or likely to disrupt the educational activities.
This restriction reasonably could be classified as a regulation based on
communicative impact. However, doing so places too much emphasis
on the manner and extent to which the city has chosen to articulate its
goals. If the regulation were changed to a prohibition of all demonstra-
tions within sight or sound of the schools, it would be more traditional
in form and also remove distraction as a basis. This type of evenhanded
regulation leaves ample opportunities for expression away from schools.
It is also nondistortive and therefore should be given greater deference.
It is more efficient to group these regulations with those regulations tra-
ditionally referred to as time, place and manner restrictions, which are
not subject to the heightened scrutiny of the "compelling state interest"
test. Continuation of the communicative impact basis is unnecessary so
long as no hypothetical is developed that combines the communicative
impact basis, violation of one of the two criteria of equality and nondis-
tortion, and lack of paternalistic concern about acceptance or negative
reaction.
11I. The Court has noted in dictum that the government's fear of acceptance of an
idea is not a permissible basis for speech regulation. First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 789-92 (1978).
112. Id. See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
113. Stone, Content Reglation, supra note 4, at 216-17 n.7.
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If the efficacy category is divided into negative and positive reac-
tions, most restrictions will be based on concern for acceptance. Such
restrictions are paternalistic regulations of positive efficacy; that is the
state would like to discourage the speech because it is persuasive. Re-
strictions based on concern for negative reaction by the audience, such
as to offensive speech, are paternalistic regulations of negative reactions
or negative efficacy. Negative and positive efficacy subsume any regula-
tions within Professor Stone's communicative impact category that do
not easily fit into the content-based categories of viewpoint and subject-
matter restrictions. Regulations of this type exhibit the same paternal-
ism as viewpoint and subject-matter restrictions because they lack neu-
trality and distort the debate. Even when the state is concerned about
some reaction other than acceptance, such as when the audience is of-
fended by sexually explicit mailings, paternalism results if the speech is
regulated to prevent the reaction. Although the means may be different,
the method is as destructive of first amendment values as the direct, but
less subtle regulation of disfavored speech. These regulations may rea-
sonably be grouped with the viewpoint and subject-matter bases. Thus,
the communicative impact category or efficacy category may reasonably
be eliminated.
D. Content Regulation by Restrictions Based on the Identity of the Speaker
In First National Bank v. Bellotti,1 14 the Court confronted the ques-
tion of "whether the corporate identity of a speaker deprives [the] pro-
posed speech of what otherwise would be its clear entitlement to
protection."' 5 The answer was not an unqualified "no" because the
Court did not hold that corporations and other entities share all the
rights of a natural person, but instead held that the regulation was an
unconstitutional attempt to restrict protected speech.' 16
Although the restriction in Bellotti on contributions and expendi-
tures for the purpose of affecting a popular vote on issues not materially
affecting the property or business of the corporation was reviewed
under the "compelling state interest" test,' 17 it is not clear whether the
Court would subject all restrictions based on the identity of the speaker
to that test. Although a finding of a legislative purpose giving an advan-
tage to one side of the debate theoretically would make the difference in
what test the Court would apply, it is not clear that the Court found such
a purpose or relied on such in holding that the "compelling state inter-
est" test applied.' 18
The regulation in Bellotti may be viewed as a subject-matter restric-
tion as well as a speaker restriction because the legislation restricted
speech not only because of its corporate identity, but also because of the
114. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
115. Id. at 778.
116. Id. at 776, 786-92.
117. Id. at 767-68, 786-92.
118. See id. at 785-86. 785-86 n.22.
1985]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW V
subject on which the corporation chose to communicate.'I11 Such a
characterization raises the question of why this type of restriction should
be tested by the most stringent of first amendment tests. Only when one
segment of society is being stripped of its first amendment rights is a
restriction truly based on identity alone. In all other cases the decision
to restrict will be based on either the subject matter or the viewpoint
associated with the speaker. Unless there is a personal or group animus
on the state's part, the motivation will be one of promotion of a view-
point or the distortion of debate by limiting discussion on a subject. As
in Bellotti, the legislature may have an admirable goal such as fostering
individual debate and preventing special interests from exercising un-
due influence,120 but these altruistic and well-reasoned goals do not jus-
tify the circumscription of debate when it results in distortion or lack of
neutrality.
Restrictions based on the identity of the speaker should be tested by
the previously identified factors. First, such restrictions distort public
debate when they exclude a group or class that plays a part in establish-
ing the patterns and policies of American society. Even if all corporate
speech activities were restricted, corporate policy-making on economic
matters would still give corporations a significant role in shaping society.
There appears to be no better reason to permit the restriction of corpo-
rate speech than to permit the restriction of speech of any ethnic or ra-
cial group.
It also appears that restrictions based on the identity of the speaker
create inequalities instead of promoting evenhanded regulation. When
a bias or prejudice directed at a particular group is associated with re-
straints on speech, there exists a clear case of inequality destructive of
traditional first amendment values. If such regulation is not based on a
desire to hinder a particular group's expression, then the regulation re-
flects concern for the result that may follow from the group's expres-
sion. Such a regulation is then fundamentally a viewpoint or subject-
matter regulation that exclusively affects a particular group. Restric-
tions of this type are as unacceptable as any directly-imposed content-
based restriction.
Even when the classification is seemingly benign, as in the corporate
speech limitation of Bellotti, there are elements of both distortion and
inequality. A state should not be allowed to decide that legally created
entities such as corporations are not entitled to speak on certain sub-
jects, although such state actions could be justified on the basis of philo-
sophical paradigms or a reasonable interpretation of the intent of the
framers. The relevant question here, however, is not whether such ac-
tion may be justified, but whether such a regulation violates the equality
value. Even if such a regulation does not distort the debate, the answer
has to be that its disparate and unequal treatment will certainly stifle
debate. In addition, although not singling out members of the group
119. Id. at 767-68.
120. See id. at 788-89.
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for regulation, restrictions such as those in Belloti also damage the self-
realization value because such restrictions curtail group speech activities
that may contribute to the development of group members as
individuals.
As Professor Redish has observed, the self-realization value is not
mutually exclusive of other first amendment values such as the "demo-
cratic process" and the "marketplace of ideas" values. 121 Nor am I sug-
gesting that the values underlying the first amendment be reexamined.
The self-realization value suggested by Professor Redish and others
adds something that is missing from the equality and marketplace-of-
ideas concerns suggested by Professor Stone. If one accepts the self-
realization value as a first principle of first amendment theory, then reg-
ulations that inhibit that process are suspect. Those that do so directly
and forcefully by limiting viewpoint may be more damaging to that first
principle than those that indirectly and insubstantially interfere with the
self-realization process.
Professor Redish believes that content-neutral regulations may im-
pair free expression and, thereby, undermine individual self-realization
to an even greater extent than some content-specific restrictions.
-2 2
This seems to be an accurate conclusion. Compare, for example, a regu-
lation that prohibits Ku Klux Klan members from burning crosses and a
regulation prohibiting all speech within one-half mile of any "public"
building. Although the latter is clearly content-neutral, it is far more
likely to inhibit discussion and self-realization than is the very content-
specific, but limited-scope regulation against KKK symbolic speech.
This does not mean that the self-realization model is not useful. In
both hypotheticals, the regulation impaired self-realization and, there-
fore, is suspect. Thus, the self-realization model will make suspect a far
larger group of regulations than would an analysis using the equality
and nondistortion values, even when those values are used together.
Lack of equality and distortion in speech restrictions also damage the
self-realization value, but unlike the "marketplace of ideas" and "demo-
cratic process" values, which appear undamaged by neutral, nondistor-
tive regulations, it seems that these regulations-traditionally described
as time, place and manner restrictions-may be destructive of the self-
realization value.123 Thus, all speech-impairing regulations should be
treated in a similar manner even when not content-based;124 otherwise,
distinctions must be made between the types of the impairment and
their relative significance.
At this point it is perhaps worthwhile to explain what the self-reali-
zation value adds to the analysis of what level of review should be ap-
121. Redish, Free Speech, supra note 1, at 594.
122. See Redish, Content Distinction, supra note 4, at 129-30.
123. This is the solution proposed by Professor Redish. See id. at 142-44. This article
adopts a modification of Professor Redish's approach and this modified approach has an
important role in the analysis of the limitations on state interest in regulating speech about
harmful and undesirable activities.
124. See id.
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plied. From the discussion of the first five bases for regulation, it should
be apparent that any regulation that impinges on free expression will
damage the self-realization value. All speech serves the salutary pur-
pose of promoting self-realization even if it is commercial, defamatory
or incites unlawful action. 12 5 This, of course, does not mean that all
lawful speech, such as that which incites unlawful action, is absolutely
protected. 1
26
If all speech can promote self-realization, the question arises as to
how to regulate it in a constitutionally permissible manner assuming
that the self-realization value is the first principle. Professor Redish has
implicitly confronted this problem by suggesting that the first amend-
ment doctrine be modified by excising the "content distinction."
-'2 7
Although Professor Redish does not explicitly say that accepting the
self-realization value as a first principle militates against continued ac-
ceptance of the content distinction, it is apparent that to accept the self-
realization model requires the abandonment of equality and govern-
mental neutrality as first principles because some regulations that im-
pinge equally on all speech are nonetheless violative of an individual's
interest in expression and self-realization.' 28 The example Professor
Redish uses is a modification of the fact pattern in Mosley. He asks which
is more damaging to free speech interests: a prohibition of labor picket-
ing near schools or a prohibition of all picketing anywhere? ' 2 9 The ob-
vious answer is that, despite its equality, the second prohibition does
greater damage. Professor Redish would avoid content distinction by
subjecting all regulations that impinge on free expression to the same
analysis. ' 3 0 Although it is not directly stated, this appears to be the only
reasonable analysis when self-realization is accepted as a first principle
because all speech regulations damage this value. Thus, the analysis is
reduced to merely a question of the degree of the infringement. Profes-
sor Redish does an admirable job of providing for this balancing by sug-
gesting that the final step of the analysis of all speech-impinging
regulations should be a balancing of the strength of the state interest in
regulation against the speaker's ability to communicate ideas in another
way. 1 3 1
However, it seems that the purpose of balancing may be equally
well served by the adoption of the dual values of equality and non-dis-
tortion. Although Professor Redish is correct in noting that equality
alone may allow for greater infringement in some cases, this result may
be avoided if the state is required to show that not only is the equality
value protected, but that there is also no distortion of the debate. When
the state prohibits all debate on a subject or severely restricts the
125. See Redish, Free Speech, supra note 1, at 625-45.
126. See id. at 626-27.
127. See Redish, Content Distinction, supra note 4, at 136-43.
128. See id. at 134-38.
129. See id. 136-37.




amount of expression, it will distort the balance of expression and per-
suasion that would have been reached if the participants were free to
seek their own level of involvement. As previously discussed, the most
obvious method of distortion-that of limiting debate-favors the status
quo. 132
The Court's application of the "compelling state interest" test in
Bellotti seems justified because when restrictions are based on the iden-
tity of the speaker, it seems that the interest of equality and non-distor-
tion are damaged by identity-based restrictions, at least, to the same
degree as they are by content-specific regulations. Having distilled from
the current regulation cases the interests that appear to justify the appli-
cation of the "compelling state interest" test, a basis emerges for ration-
ally and coherently deciding whether identity of speaker regulations
should be stringently reviewed.
E. Content Regulation by Restrictions Based on the Identity of the Audience
Despite its artificiality and near insignificant use, the category of re-
strictions based on the identity of the audience has been included for the
purpose of exhausting all possible bases of speech regulation. Greer v.
Spock '33 and Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation 134
arguably involve this type of restriction because the audience's identity
was important in determining how much protection should be given the
speech. However, this would be a superficial conclusion because in both
cases the Court was primarily concerned with the subject matter of the
speech. The decisions turned on whether the state could restrict the
speakers as to subject matter (i.e., partisan political speech in Greer 
13 5
and offensive, but not obscene speech in Pacifica).1
36
Greer involved a Fort Dix regulation that banned speeches and dem-
onstrations of a partisan political nature.' 3 7 Spock and three other can-
didates for national office sought to campaign and distribute literature
on the military reservation and several non-candidates sought reentry to
the post to distribute literature after being evicted.' 38 Permission to
enter for these purposes was denied by the post commander, who relied
in part on his obligation to prevent interference with his troops' training
schedule and to avoid the appearance of support for a candidate by a
commanding officer. 139
The Court's opinion addressed the power of the government to
control use of its property and the specific need of the military to ex-
clude civilians from military installations. 14" After concluding that the
132. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
133. 424 U.S. 828, 831 (1976).
134. 438 U.S. 726, 730-32 (1978).
135. 424 U.S. at 831.
136. 438 U.S. at 742-48.
137. 424 U.S. at 831.
138. Id. at 832-33.
139. Id. at n.3.
140. Id. at 834-38.
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regulation was not facially invalid, 14 1 the Court found that the regula-
tions had been applied objectively and evenhandedly to keep the post
wholly free of political activity.14
2
The Court did not discuss what standard of review was applied to
the regulation, but there are indications that it was treated as a time,
place and manner restriction. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
noted that the regulation might be invalid if applied "irrationally, invidi-
ously or arbitrarily."' 14 3 Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, also
suggested that the Court's approach was "to inquire 'whether the man-
ner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a
particular place at a particular time.' "144 It seems that because the regu-
lation was applied evenhandedly to all partisan speech and other oppor-
tunities to reach the same audience were available, 14 5 the restriction,
though viewed as a valid subject-matter restriction, was tested as merely
a time, place and manner restriction of the subjects regulated.14 6
Greer demonstrates that in some instances speech restrictions would
not be permissible without the determinative influence of the combined
factors of audience identity and subject matter. Thus, it would be unac-
ceptable to regulate partisan political activity or advocates of views that
threaten the loyalty, discipline or morale of an audience unless that au-
dience were military personnel on a military installation. Nor would it
be permissible to restrict all communications to such an audience. It is
apparent, therefore, that the factors of audience and subject matter in
Greer were inextricably linked.
In Pacifica, the same confluence of concern for audience and subject
matter occurred, which was instrumental in persuading the Court that
the Federal Communications Commission restriction was permissi-
ble.14 7 George Carlin's satirical monologue, "Filthy Words," which the
Court held was not obscene, had been characterized by the FCC as pa-
tently offensive speech. 148 Because the broadcast contained patently of-
fensive language and was aired in the afternoon when children were
likely to be part of the audience, the Court found that the broadcast was
indecent. 149 The Court held that the Commission's ability to regulate
the broadcast was dependent upon the factual context of the broadcast,
including the time of day, content of the program and the medium. 15)
Thus, it seems that the particular combination of the factors of subject
141. Id. at 838.
142. Id. at 839.
143. Id. at 840.
144. Id. at 843 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Gravned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 116 (1972)); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Tinker %. Des Moines
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
145. Id. at 847, 849.
146. Greer, 424 U.S. at 834-38, 840, 843.
147. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 738-40, 749-50.
148. Id. at 731.
149. Id. at 738-41, 750-51.
150. Id. at 750.
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matter and audience were determinative of the validity of the FCC
regulation.
Cases such as Rowan v. Post Office Department 151 and Perry Education
Association v. Peny Local Educators 'Association 152 also focus some attention
on the audience identity factor as well as on the subject matter of the
speech in determining the proper amount of first amendment protec-
tion. From these cases it is apparent that audience identity alone is vir-
tually an insignificant basis for regulation.
Regulations based on audience identity should be treated in the
same manner as regulations based on speaker identity because they at-
tempt to control all communications to a person or group and, thereby,
damage the interests of equality and non-distortion. When, as in the
four cases previously discussed, the regulation is based upon the dual
elements of subject matter and audience identity, no less stringent a test
should be applied than when only one of these two factors is present.
Therefore, the "compelling state interest" test should be applied when-
ever both the audience identity and the subject matter form the bases of
the challenged speech regulation.
Self-realization is hindered by audience-based restrictions because
they retard the development of both the speaker and the audience.
Thus, the self-realization value could be stretched to include the devel-
opment of the audience as a basis for invalidating a restriction; however,
such an extension is probably unwarranted given the restriction's effect
on the self-realization of the speakers.
Because self-realization is not determined by any particular level of
speech or expressive activity, but is instead achieved by different per-
sons at different levels of involvement and expression, a regulation that
even slightly limits opportunities for expression should not, in the ab-
sence of a sufficiently important countervailing state interest, be counte-
nanced. Therefore, a limitation on a speaker's access to an audience,
such as in Greer, should be considered impermissible even though other
means of expression are available that may equally further the self-reali-
zation value.
F. Content Regulation by Restrictions Based on the Time, Place, and Manner
of the Speech
This basis for speech regulation differs from the prior five because
its focus is not content, audience, speaker or efficacy. Instead, a time,
place and manner restriction may indirectly affect all four of these fac-
tors, but in its pure form it is neutral and evenhanded. Because time,
place and manner restrictions are facially neutral and evenhanded does
not, however, mean that they never impinge freedom of expression. For
instance, although a restriction that limits all speech activities of a "con-
troversial or political nature" in the downtown of a city to between the
151. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
152. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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hours of midnight and two A.M. might be based on the legitimate con-
cern of preventing congestion resulting from speeches and demonstra-
tions during business hours, it would nonetheless violate the first
amendment, even though it is evenhanded and viewpoint neutral, be-
cause it effectively inhibits all speech. Because it imposes a limitation so
burdensome on such speech as to effectively prohibit it, such a regula-
tion would be as damaging to first amendment interests as would a ban
on public speaking about matters of controversy.
The potential invalidity of time, place and manner restrictions may
be illustrated by using the previously-developed two-part test. Although
time, place and manner restrictions are facially neutral, they have a
heavily differential effect because without the circulation of views the
status quo is advantaged. Furthermore, no criticism can be voiced nor
opposition organized without inconvenience. Thus, this type of regula-
tion seems to be both unequal in its effect and promotional of a particu-
lar viewpoint.
The content differential effect of time, place and manner restric-
tions is not a new concern. Schneider v. State 153 involved four separate
facially neutral municipal ordinances. Three prohibited all distribution
of handbills, pamphlets and similar items, while the fourth prohibited all
door-to-door canvassing and soliciting done without the prior approval
of municipal authorities.1 54 All four ordinances were held invalid be-
cause they impermissibly burdened freedom of speech and press.
1 55
Although the Court noted that not all time, place and manner restric-
tions were impermissible, it held that those that prohibited the tradition-
ally important method of communicating by pamphlets and permitted
local authorities discretion in choosing which persons would be permit-
ted to canvas door-to-door were unconstitutional abridgments of free
speech. 1
5 6
These two principles-the power to regulate and the protection of
free speech-are, in a superficial sense, logically inconsistent. However,
by harmonizing the underlying inconsistencies, it is possible to under-
stand not only why time, place and manner restrictions are permissible,
but also why they should logically be subjected to a less stringent test of
constitutionality. To do so, however, requires a reexamination of the
three interests damaged by content regulation.
For time, place and manner restrictions to be valid, they must not
be triggered by content. Three of the four ordinances in Schneider were
neutral in design and operation.15 7 The fourth, however, was subject to
abuse because municipal authorities were allowed discretion that could
be used to suppress particular viewpoints; 1 511 a police official had the
power to determine what literature could be distributed and who could
153. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
154. Id. at 153-57.
155. Id. at 160-65.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 154-57.
158. Id. at 157-59, 163-65.
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distribute it. '59 This type of restriction is a classic example of a regula-
tion impairing the equality and nondistortion values. When such discre-
tion exists, officials may treat speakers differently on the basis of
content, thereby, violating the equality principle. Such discretion also
distorts public debate by filtering out communication that public offi-
cials deem is "undesirable."
The self-realization value is impaired by restrictions such as those
found in Schneider because there is both a reduction in the opportunities
for expression and a reduction in the expression of specific views and
the concomitant specific individual development. Because the three
aforementioned values were damaged by the fourth Schneider regulation
in the same manner as they would have been by content-based restric-
tions, the regulation was properly invalidated. The municipality was un-
able to show a "compelling state interest" served by the ordinance nor
was it able to show that its restriction did not unnecessarily impinge ex-
pression in accomplishing the restriction's goals.16
0
The other three regulations reviewed in Schneider were content neu-
tral in both design and application because they simply forbade all
speakers from communicating by one method. 16 1 Therefore, they did
not directly violate the equality principle. There was, however, a greater
probable effect on speakers who could not afford a means of communi-
cating other than by pamphlet. The Court also noted that pamphlets
are "historical weapons in the defense of liberty" 16 2 and that the availa-
bility of other places for the distribution of pamphlets did not compen-
sate for the restriction on distribution in streets and alleys, which the
Court held were "natural and proper places" for disseminating opinion
and information. ' 63
Professor Stone suggests that content-neutral restrictions of this
type may have a differential effect on those with unpopular or controver-
sial views and those whose ability to disseminate views is limited by fi-
nances or the characteristics of the intended audience. 164 The logic and
appeal of Professor Stone's position is illustrated by the following exam-
ple. An ordinance banning face-to-face discussions and pamphleteering
during harvest season at migrant worker camps would be a content-neu-
159. 1d. at 163.
160. Te Court did not analyze the ordinance in terms of the importance of the pur-
pose of' the regulation. It stated that regulations of canvassing mav be permissible. bi
that this regulation was an impermissible burden on speech. Id. at 163-65. The censor-
ship concern seems to be preeminent in the Court's reasoning. Id. at 163-64. [here is
language indicating that the ordinance was not sufficiently narrow to be a constitutional
regulation intended to prevent trespass and fraud. Id. at 164. [he Court found that there
were other methods available to accomplish such goals, noting that
Ii It it is said that thcir means are less efficient and convenient than bestowal of
police authorities to decide what information may be disseminated front house to
house, and who may impart the inlitrmation. the answer is that considerations of
this sort do not it empower a municipality tt abridge freedom of speech and press.
Id.
161. Id. at 154-57. 162.
162. /(1. ati 162.
163. Id. at 163.
164. St ne. 'mnletit Iftitdaliott, ,mlu/a note 4, at 218.
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tral restriction seriously infringing speech because such workers are dif-
ficult to reach for activities such as union organization except when
brought together for work. Furthermore, odd hours, the lack of access
to televisions and radios by these workers and the higher than average
rate of illiteracy may make communication with them during harvest sea-
son through mass media difficult. Even if such an audience could be
reached by these methods, such communication would be less cost effec-
tive and convenient than direct contact, given the audience's size and
concentration.
Thus, there may be lurking in these superficially neutral restrictions
a disparate effect on certain speakers, audiences and viewpoints.
Although the "compelling state interest" test of content-differential reg-
ulations should not automatically be imposed, it would be a mistake to
dismiss these restrictions as harmless simply because of their superficial
neutrality and evenhandedness.
The distortive effect of time, place and manner restrictions is also
readily apparent as the following example will illustrate. Suppose that
within a state there are two cities each having a nationally respected
newspaper that often present opposing points of view and, thereby, pro-
vide a bipartisan perspective on most issues. If the state legislature
banned all written discussion of "controversial or partisan issues" ex-
cept as presented in these two newspapers, such a restriction would un-
doubtably be held to be an unconstitutional abridgment of free speech
and press. Although such a prohibition would be an evenhanded re-
striction of all other speech activities and could be legitimately classed as
a time, place and manner restriction because no particular view would
be favored, it should certainly be held to be invalid on the ground that
such a prohibition was content-specific because it banned all views too
controversial or unpopular for the two major newspapers.
Thus, this type of restriction would limit the opportunities available
to those with no access to the two major newspapers and would have a
distortive effect on any debate of controversial or partisan issues,
thereby violating the "marketplace-of-ideas" and "democratic process"
values. Furthermore, for those who believe that the first amendment
contains the specific value of self-realization, this type of regulation is
inimical to that interest. By limiting opportunity for expression and by
forcing views through the filter of the paper's editorial process, individ-
ual self-realization is dangerously inhibited. To the extent that society
allows individuals to make decisions, it should allow individuals the
means and information needed to make a responsible choice. When the
choice is not removed, but the ability to reasonably make it is inhibited,
the "self-realization" and "democratic process" values are damaged.'("1
5
165. See Redish, Free Speech, sura note 1, at 605-07.
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IV. VIEWING TIME, PLACE AND MANNER RESTRICTIONS FROM THE
PROPER PERSPECTIVE
First amendment cases have overemphasized the importance of
"time, place, or manner restrictions."' 6 6 Some opinions recognize that
the repetition of the phrase "time, place or manner" is an insufficient
justification for all such restrictions. An example of an in-depth analysis
of time, place and manner restrictions by the Court is Heffron v. Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. 167 In Heffron the Society chal-
lenged a rule adopted by the Minnesota State Fair organizers that
prohibited sales, solicitations and distribution of merchandise or litera-
ture except from licensed booths. ' 6 8 The Society sought invalidation of
this rule on the ground that it suppressed speech necessary to the prac-
tice of Sankirtan, a religious practice requiring members to solicit dona-
tions and sell religious literature. 169
Justice White, writing for the majority, noted that although the So-
ciety's activities were fully protected speech activities even though the
literature was offered for sale, these activities were "subject to reason-
able time, place, and manner restrictions."170 The Court also argued
that the regulation's classification as a time, place and manner restric-
tion was not determinative of its validity because such regulations must
also satisfy three distinct requirements: 1) they must be justified without
reference to the content of the speech; 2) they must serve a significant
governmental interest; and, 3) there must be alternative means to com-
municate the affected message.171
The Court's choice of wording for its content neutrality require-
ment is interesting for the Court held that "[a] major criterion for a valid
166. Consider, for example, the dicta in Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972). In striking the
Chicago regulation that prohibited labor picketing in the vicinity of a school, the Court
wrote: "In this case the ordinance describes impermissible picketing not in terms of time,
place, and manner, but in terms of subject matter. The regulation 'thus slip[s] from the
neutrality of time, place, and circumstance into a concern about content.' " Id. at 99 (foot-
note omitted) (quoting Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup.
CT. REV. 1, 29). The implication is that restrictions which focus only on time, place and
manner and are not keyed to intent are valid exercises of the police power. What is miss-
ing from this analysis is an examination of why most time, place and manner restrictions
do not unconstitutionally impair free expression. This can be determined only by examin-
ing how these time, place and manner restrictions operate without damaging the funda-
mental first amendment interests that are damaged by content-based restrictions. Instead
of classi 'ing the speech, the Court should examine the interest underlying the speech and
determine whether this interest is damaged by restrictions falling under the broad rubric
of time, place and manner. The answer will not always be that the interest is safe when
speech is restricted in such a manner.
167. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
168. Id. at 643-44. The booths were allocated on a nondiscriminatory first-come, first-
serve basis. Id.
169. Id. at 645. The Society did not challenge the rule as a specific violation of its
religious freedom and did not seek an exemption from the rule for its practices as the
Minnesota Supreme Court seemed to believe appropriate. Instead, the Society concluded
that any right it had was the resuIt of the general right of all persons to conduct similar
aclivilics at the firgrounds. Id. at 652 11.15.
170. Id. at 6-17.
171. Id. at 647-48.
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time, place, and manner restriction is that the restriction 'may not be
based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.' ,172 Im-
plicit in this criterion is the possibility that time, place and manner re-
strictions can be invalid. However, the Court fails to explain why these
restrictions may be invalid. It seems that invalidity is, in part, a function
of being "based upon either the content or subject matter,"1 73 because
of the link to content and subject-matter restrictions.' 74 Similarly, the
Court states that a valid restriction must serve a significant state interest
and must leave alternative forums for expression of the restricted
speech. '
75
Putting aside the requirement of a substantial state interest, the
combination of content and subject-matter neutrality and the availability
of alternative means of communication is very similar to the previously
developed two-part analysis. The combination of the neutrality and
availability of alternatives elements provides an analytical method very
similar to the analytical method based upon the neutrality and non-dis-
tortion elements in which the presence of either element triggers the
requirement that the state meet the "compelling state interest" test.
The Commission's regulation in Consolidated Edison 176 is an example
of a time, place and manner restriction that failed the content neutrality
requirement. The Commission had attempted to prohibit all inserts in
utility bills that addressed "controversial issues of public policy."1 7 7 Be-
cause the Commission's regulation prevented all expressions on contro-
versial issues in the form of bill inserts, it was, in its broadest sense, a
time, place and manner restriction. Although there was no attempt to
suppress just one side of any debate or any particular viewpoint,178 the
Court had little difficulty in finding the regulation invalid because it lim-
ited the choice of subjects for the public debate that may occur within
the forum of utility bill inserts. 179 Thus, it is insufficient to merely class-
ify the regulation as a time, place and manner restriction.
Time, place and manner restrictions may unconstitutionally inter-
fere with debate by impermissibly limiting the opportunity to partici-
pate. Schneider 180 is an early example of this criterion being applied to
invalidate what would otherwise be labeled a time, place and manner
restriction. Although three of the four ordinances in Schneider did not
discriminate or offer the opportunity to discriminate between viewpoints
or subjects, all four were invalidated. Part of the basis for invalidating
the ordinances in Schneider was the weak justification for the restrictions;
172. Id. at 648 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 536 (1980) (emphasis added)).
173. Id.
174. See id. at 648, 649.
175. Id. at 649, 654.
176. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
177. ld. at 537.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 538.
1810. See supa notes 150-60 and accompanying text.
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specifically, the necessity of keeping the streets clean."'8 The traditional
role of pamphleteering in a democratic society and the lack of an appro-
priate substitute for the distribution of pamphlets in public places were
also significant factors. ' 8 2 Thus, the clear implication of Schneider is that
when a state takes away an important traditional method of expression
for which there is not adequate substitute, the state must show a state
interest more substantial than that of clean and orderly streets. '
8 3
More recently in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,' 8 4 the Court
reviewed an ordinance prohibiting all "off-site" commercial and some
non-commercial billboards.' 8 5  The ordinance was held unconstitu-
tional because it effectively removed one method of communication
without the availability of alternative channels 186 and distinguished be-
tween permissible and impermissible signs on the basis of content.'
8 7
However, it is unclear whether either infirmity alone, especially that of
the lack of an alternative forum, would have prompted the Court to in-
validate the ordinance. Nevertheless, the availability of alternative
modes of communication continues to be an important factor in deter-
mining the validity of time, place and manner restrictions.188
The divergent results reached in Heffron, in which restrictions on
peripatetic pamphleteering and soliciting were upheld, and Metromedia
may, in part, be harmonized by examining the scope and significance of
the effect each challenged restriction had on the speaker's ability to
communicate the same message by alternative methods. For the
Krishna Society in Heffron, the Society member's method of communica-
tion was Sankirtan' 8 9 and the site for this communication was the Min-
nesota State Fair.' 90  Sankirtan involves two different expressive
activities: proselytizing and fund solicitation. The Society's proselytiz-
ing involved both oral communication and the distribution of leaflets.' 9 '
Because only the distribution of leaflets was prohibited, the Society
members were free to walk about and communicate orally with
181. Id. at 162.
182. Id. at 162-63.
183. Id. at 162. Also appearing in the opinion is an early example of the least restric-
live alternative analysis. The Court noted that: "This constitutional protection [of the
freedom of speech and press] does not deprive a city of all power to prevent street litter-
ing. There are obvious methods of preventing littering. Amongst these is the punishment
of those who actually throw papers on the streets." Id. at 162.
184. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
185. Id. at 493-96.
186. Id. at 516.
187. Id. at 516-17.
188. This is a superficial enunciation of the nondistortion interest, an interest which is
at the core of this article's proposed content analysis. If a government can effectively
choke off all discussion, even if it is an evenhanded manner, it may benefit the status quo
or some other chosen position. The availability of equally etlletive, eflicient and conve-
nient alternate methods ensures that the debate will not be distorted bv the removal or
amplification of any voice. f (onsolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 530 (l[he Court r'jecied as
tnconslitutional ihe Commission's "neutral' suppression of all discussion and noted that
hosility to conteni-based restrictions extends to suppressions ofa ,n entire topic-.).
189. Ileffh. 452 U.S. at 645.
190. Id. at 643-45.
191. Id. at 656 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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fairgoers.' 2 The second type of expressive activity, fund solicitation,
was prohibited except from assigned booths.11 3 Thus, the Society had
unrestricted access to fairgoers to communicate its views orally, but was
restricted in the distribution of leaflets and solication of funds.
This ban on pamphleteering and soliciting did not extend beyond
the fairgrounds. Society members were free to distribute leaflets and
solicit funds outside the fairground's gates and in any other public place.
Although the exact audience may not have been available in these loca-
tions, the restriction did not prohibit the Society's expressive activities
in these locations. Furthermore, the Society had the opportunity to en-
gage in both pamphleteering and soliciting from an assigned booth.
Although these were restrictions on expression, they were not restric-
tions which eliminated the medium as an effective method of
expression.'
9 4
In Metromedia, advertisers were prohibited from using billboards for
virtually any purpose other than on-site commercial advertising. San Di-
ego's ordinance effectively eliminated noncommercial communication
by billboard and limited commercial advertising to a fraction of its tradi-
tional use.' 9 5 Although the plurality held the limitation on commercial
billboards to be a reasonable time, place and manner restriction, it re-
jected a similar justification for the noncommercial billboard restric-
tion.' 9 6 The virtual prohibition of noncommercial billboards was held
invalid because it impermissibly differentiated between billboards on the
basis of content.'9 7 Furthermore, the ordinance failed to leave sufficient
alternative means of communicating messages that would have been
communicated by noncommercial billboards.19 8
The Court relied on the parties' stipulation that other forms of ad-
vertising were insufficient because of inconvenience, expense or inability
to reach the same audience. °9 9 It is unclear whether the ordinance
would have ben invalidated on this ground alone had it evenhandedly
prohibited all noncommercial billboards, although the plurality does
seem to imply that such an ordinance would be suspect.
2 0 0
Heffron and Metromedia are excellent examples of how time, place
and manner restrictions flirt with invalidity by being so restrictive that
they effectively foreclose an important means of communication. In Hef-
fron, ample opportunities existed for the Society to communicate its
views even by the methods that were restricted within the fairgrounds.
In Metromedia, however, persons who chose a billboard as the most effec-
tive or convenient method of communicating were unable to use their
192. Id. at 656-57.
193. Id. at 656.
194. C(.] Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147. 161-62 (1939) (interest in preventing litter-
ing insulficient to permnit prohibition of pamphleteering).
195. See Aetromedia, 453 U.S. at 501, 503.
196. Id. at 512-13, 515-17.
197. Id. at 516.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 515 n.20.
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preferred medium. Furthermore, for those persons with a limited
budget who wished to reach a large audience over an extended period of
time, there may have been no effective alternative to the billboard. For
the Society, their preferred communicative method was available in
other places as was the alternative of peripatetic proselytizing without
soliciting funds or distributing literature. Thus, there was a higher
probability that the Metromedia ordinance would have had a distortive
effect on public debate than would the Heffron restriction.
The previously discussed cases illustrate that time, place and man-
ner restrictions are not inherently innocuous. Tagging a challenged re-
striction with this phrase does little to advance the analysis of a
restriction's validity. Because a time, place and manner restriction must
be content-neutral and leave open alternative methods of communicat-
ing any messages impeded by the restriction to be valid,20 1 it may be
more helpful to begin the first amendment analysis by focusing on the
elements of neutrality and nondistortion-the two interests previously
identified as determinative of whether a heightened level of scrutiny
should be applied-instead of jumping to determine whether the chal-
lenged restriction falls within the time, place and manner rubric.
In instances where neither of these two interests are damaged by an
alleged time, place and manner restriction, the restriction should be
classified as a "valid" time, place and manner restriction provided that it
meets the reasonableness test. However, if either of the interests are
damaged, then there should be applied a heightened level of scrutiny.
V. THE LIMITS OF STATE POWER IN DISCOURAGING HARMFUL OR
UNDESIRABLE ACTIVITY
Neutrality and nondistortion have been identified as two factors
that trigger heightened scrutiny. Subject-matter restrictions may dam-
age either or both of these values. Therefore, these restrictions can not
be treated as time, place and manner restrictions because they are either
content-based or they distort debate by preempting or restricting the
discussion of an entire subject. This section will initially distinguish sev-
eral harmful or undesirable speech cases from the category of time,
place and manner restrictions. It will then be suggested that, despite the
heightened level of scrutiny that should be applied to these subject-mat-
ter restrictions, there are legitimate state interests to be served by them.
Finally, it will be proposed that a precondition to the legitimacy of sub-
ject-matter restrictions based on a state's interest in preventing harmful
or undesirable speech be incorporated into the first amendment
analysis.
201. 11elromedia, 453 U.S. at 516. In addition, such a restriction must serve a legitimate
and substantial state interest. This third requirement is important because it establishes
the minimum state interest required tojustify any restriction on speech. This article exam-
ines why certain types of speech can be interfered with only ifa high level of state interest.
instead of a mere nontrivial state interest, is shown. Therefore, all speech regulations
must satisfy this "substantial interest" requirement, but some must satisfy an even greater
interest.
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A. Classifying Restrictions on Harmfid or Undesirable Speech
In Consolidated Edison2 0 2 the Commission prohibited all inserts dis-
cussing controversial issues of public policy. 203 One of the three justifi-
cations advanced by the Commission 20 4 was that the order was a valid
time, place and manner restriction. 20 5 The case is an excellent illustra-
tion of why the time, place and manner classification is more rubric than
helpful. The Commission asserted that the regulation was merely a lim-
ited regulation because it applied only to bill inserts. The Court, how-
ever, questioned the basis of the regulation as well as its scope. The
Court dismissed the time, place and manner justification as untenable
because the regulation was based on the content of the speech. 2° 63
As previously discussed, the classification of a regulation as a time,
place and manner restriction is a prelude to asking questions about
three concerns: (1) content neutrality; (2) availability of alternative
means of communication; and, (3) the presence of a substantial state
interest. 20 7 In terms of the analysis developed in this article, the Com-
mission's restriction was one for which a compelling state interest need
be shown because it was distortive of debate on controversial issues. Be-
cause it was an evenhanded prohibition of all discussion of such issues in
bill inserts, it did not violate the equality principle. However, because it
prohibited all discussion of controversial subjects, it was distortive of
debate. As the Court pointed out, to allow the government to select
topics for discussion is to allow it to control the debate. 20 8 Strict scru-
tiny should be applied when control of this type violates either the
equality or non-distortion values.
In Consolidated Edison, the Commission also failed to justify the con-
tent regulation by showing a sufficiently compelling state interest.2 0'
Time, place and manner restrictions, which are neutral and nondistor-
tive, must be based on a significant state concern and must provide for
adequate alternative means of communication.
2 10
When the state decides what is fit for discussion by promoting or
prohibiting the discussion of a topic, it has expressed an opinion on the
importance of the discussion. This may violate the equality interest in
its broadest sense.2 11 When the regulation limits not only discussion of
202. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
203. Id. at 537.
204. The Commission argued that, in addition to being a time, place and manner re-
striction, the prohibition was a valid subject-matter restriction or a narrowly drawn means
of serving a compelling state interest. Id. at 535.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 536.
207. Id. at 535-36. See aLvo supra notes 163-201 and accompanying text.
208. Conisolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 538.
209. After failing to justify the regulation as a permissiblc time, place and manner re-
striction or an evenhanded "subject-matter" restriction, the Commission argued that there
was a compelling state interest in protecting the consumer from information that was [lot
useful; thereby, safeguarding a privacy interest. Id. at 537.
210. Id. at 535. The dual concerns of equality and lack of distortion color the require-
ments of content-neutrality and the availability of alternate channels.
211. The regulation in Consolidated Edison was this type of paternalistic invasion of the
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a subject, but also directly favors one side of the debate, both the equal-
ity and nondistortion values are damaged.
Harmful or undesirable speech is that category of speech concern-
ing subjects which the state has determined are of little value and are
socially suspect. This is an intentionally broad category; its utility as a
category is limited to elucidating the thesis of this article. When the
interest sought to be furthered by the state is the prevention of harmful
or undesirable conduct, speech promoting such conduct will be catego-
rized as harmful or undesirable speech. Harmful or undesirable con-
duct is conduct which, although not illegal, the state may regulate or
even prohibit in the interest of the health, welfare and morals of the
public. Some examples of this type of conduct are drinking and smok-
ing as well as legalized prostitution and gambling. Thus, an example of
harmful or undesirable speech would be a commercial advertisement of
any of these products or activities.
In a number of cases, the Supreme Court, lower federal courts and
some state courts have reviewed the constitutionality of subject-matter
regulations that impair free expression. Because of the breadth of cases
covered by the category of harmful or undesirable speech, this article
will focus on a relatively small group of cases. Excluded from the cate-
gory of harmful or undesirable speech are expressions that the state
deems to be harmful or undesirable in and of itself and that has no con-
nection to harmful or undesirable conduct. An example of this type of
speech may be found in Consolidated Edison, where speech which was not
associated with any harmful or undesirable conduct, was nevertheless
regulated because it was deemed by the state to be of little social
value. 2
12
The remainder of this article will develop an analogy between sub-
ject-matter restrictions of the type found in Consolidated Edison2 1-3 and
those regulating harmful or undesirable speech. From this analogy, it
will be argued that the "compelling state interest" test should be ap-
plied in cases where harmful and undesirable speech is regulated. It
also will be argued that the state typically may not justify such speech
restrictions unless it first prohibits the activity deemed to be harmful or
undesirable. Failure to prohibit the activity would be conclusive evi-
dence of the lack of a compelling state interest in regulating speech
about that activity.
B. The Limits of State Interest in Regulating Harmful or Undesirable Speech
In Dunagin v. City of Oxford2 14 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit resolved a conflict between two separate Mississippi district
discussion; to promote not one side or the other, but to ban the entire range of topics
being discussed. Although not directly relevant to this article's thesis, the case is useful io
indicate why prohibitions of an entire subject in their most general and viewpoint-neutral
form are damaging io first amendment interests.
212. Id. at 537.
213. Id. at 536.
214. 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983), cerl. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3553 (1984).
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court rulings. The district courts had reached opposite conclusions on
the validity of Mississippi's virtual ban on liquor advertising.2 15 This
severe restriction on liquor advertising cannot be characterized as a
time, place and manner restriction because it was activated by the con-
tent of the advertising.
2 16
Although acknowledging that its discussion of this subject was dic-
tum, 2 17 the court's opinion about the extent to which a state may con-
trol speech concerning lawful, but harmful or undesirable conduct is
disturbing:
While we need not so hold, there may be no First Amend-
ment protection of purely commercial advertising of those
products which the state could entirely proscribe. Or, if by vir-
tue of its police power the state may prohibit or severely limit a
trade or conduct (e.g., prostitution, hand-guns, explosive de-
vices, marijuana, pipes and paraphernalia designed to be used
with illegal drugs), the state may be entitled to allow the trade
but restrict the advertising without having to justify the restric-
tion by balancing the state interest against the public interest in
the commercial speech.
2 18
The Fifth Circuit erred both in holding that Mississippi may validly pro-
hibit liquor advertising in all areas, despite its legal sale in some ar-
eas,2 1 9 and also in its dictum concerning the constitutionally-imposed
limits of state action to discourage lawful liquor consumption. The
court offered no analysis to support its conclusion that a state may
choose to prohibit advertising of lawful activities or trades. 220 Instead,
the court based its decision on its belief that the four-part test for valid-
ity of commercial speech restrictions set forth in Central Hudson had been
satisfied by the Mississippi liquor advertising regulation. 22 ' By conclud-
ing that the four-part Central Hudson test had been satisfied, the court
was able to avoid the question of constitutional limitations on state
prohibitions of speech concerning a legal activity; a question inherent in
the Central Hudson test.
The court should have answered two related questions when it ap-
plied the Central Hudson test: (1) how can an interest be substantial if a
state chooses to indirectly promote that interest; and (2) how can a view-
215. Id. at 739-40. All off-site advertising was prohibited and the only advertising per-
mitted was a printed and unilluminated sign eight inches or less, stating that the establish-
ment sold package liquors or was a "lounge." Id. at 740 n.3.
216. See supra notes 202-14 and accompanying text; see also Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S.
at 537; Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 516-17.
217. For two reasons, the Fifth Circuit's discussion of the limits in regulating speech
about lawful activity must be viewed with caution. First, the court acknowledged that its
discussion of this subject was dictum. Dinagin, 718 F.2d at 742. Almost as important was
the court's reliance on the special deference provided by the twenty-first amendment to
state control over liquor. Id. at 743-45. As an element of this special deference to state
regulation, the court applied a reverse commerce clause analysis: presumptive validity for
the state law and the lack of federal regulatory power. Id.
218. Id. at 742 (footnote omitted).
219. See Barnes, supra note 2.




point restriction of speech be no more restrictive than necessary in fur-
thering the state interest? Although the court faithfully applied the
Central Hudson test, it nonetheless reached the wrong result because of
its failure to address these two questions, both of which underlie at least
one of the four elements of the test. Thus, the court failed to appreciate
the significance of the Supreme Court's requirement that speech regula-
tion promote a substantial state interest.
222
Mississippi's asserted state interest was the discouragement of li-
quor consumption. 223 Under Mississippi's regulatory scheme, some
counties permit liquor sales and consumption, while in counties where
the residents have voted to maintain the pre-existing statewide prohibi-
tion, such activities are prohibited. 2 24 Because the advertising restric-
tions applied to "dry" counties as well as "wet" counties, the court
rejected the asserted justification that, because liquor sales and con-
sumption were illegal in almost one half of the state's counties, the re-
strictions were valid. 2 2 5 Nevertheless, the court found that the state's
ambivalent attitude towards liquor sales and consumption expressed a
substantial state interest in discouraging those activities and further
found that liquor advertising encouraged those activities. 22 6 The court,
therefore, concluded that a nontrivial state interest was present suffi-
cient to justify a commercial speech regulation.
There are several problems with the court's analysis of the state in-
terest. First of all, the court describes the state interest as the reduction
of consumption. Therefore, a law regulating advertising would seem to
be justified only if it could be shown that there is a link between in-
creased advertising and increased sales. One of the district courts did
make such a finding.22 7 However, two other portions of the opinion
characterized the state interest as the control of the artificial stimulation
of liquor sales and consumption. 2 28 These two interests are different
and may be furthered in different ways. For instance, if the state interest
222. This is the third part of the four-part test. The full test is:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive an-
swers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the govern-
mental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
223. Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 747. The Mississippi legislature permitted counties and judi-
cial districts to allow liquor sales, but concomitantly reiterated the state's desire to prohibit
the sale and consumption of liquor. Only where the local populace voted to permit sale
and consumption of liquor would the prohibition be lifted. Id. at 740.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 742-43.
226. Id. at 747, 750-51.
227. Id. at 747. The trial judge in Dunagn upheld the regulation as a legitimate attempt
to reduce consumption and, therefore, reduce the problems associated with the increased
consumption of alcohol. The judge relied on one expert's opinion and his own common
sense for the necessary link between consumption and the substantive evil sought to be
abated. Id.
228. Id. at 747 (state interest section), 751 (effectiveness of the regulation section).
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is in preventing the artificial stimulation of consumption, the regulation
could have been tailored to prohibit the types of marketing techniques
that make liquor consumption attractive. Thus, the court should not
have blithely assumed that there was not a more direct and less intrusive
means of advancing the state interest than a prohibition on all liquor
advertising.
The court exhibited signs of discomfort with its finding of the exist-
ence of a state interest and that the regulation directly and narrowly ad-
vanced that interest. 2 29 In an effort to alleviate its discomfort, the court
unfortunately expanded its inquiry. 2 30 The court cited Central Hudson
and Metromedia in support of its proposition that "common sense" is
sometimes sufficient to support a legislative judgment, there being no
need for "concrete evidence."'2 3 1 Superficially, this seems a reasonable
proposition, but the "common sense" conclusion of the Mississippi leg-
islature was that advertising increased consumption, not that it artifically
stimulated consumption. Furthermore, there is no "common sense" ba-
sis for concluding that nothing less than a virtual ban on advertising
would prevent the artificial stimulation of liquor consumption. By shift-
ing from one statement of the state interest to another, the court never
directly addressed the question of whether a virtual ban on advertising
constitutes state regulation more restrictive than was necessary to re-
duce liquor consumption.
23 2
Even if the state interest is reduced consumption, there remains the
troublesome issue of how far a state may go to discourage a lawful activ-
ity by regulating speech that encourages the activity. Although the court
noted that it was unnecessary to address this issue,233 this determination
seems to be based on the court's characterization of the state interest as
the control of the artificial stimulation of liquor sales and consumption.
If the interest were more broadly stated as reduced consumption, this
issue should have been addressed.
2 34
Central Hudson may have laid the foundation for the court's errors in
Dunagin. Its four-part test of commercial speech was the product of the
holdings of several commercial speech cases. In the abstract, the Central
Hudson test is a helpful and accurate reflection of prior holdings. Since
l17irginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,2 3 5 however,
the Court has never held that commercial speech could be differentially
229. See id. at 748-49 n.8.
230. See id. at 747, 751.
231. Id. at 750.
232. The court returns to the artificial stimulation concern to say that the ban is no
broader than necessary because only promotional advertising is affected. See id. at 751.
There is no discussion here of whcther only certain types of advertising techniques would
artificially stimulate consumption. If it is merely a commonsense approach the court is
using, would not a ban on only that advertising which sought to communicate the glamor-
ous or attractive side of drinking be just as reasonable?
233. Id. at 472.
234. On the importance of establishing with precision the state interest advanced b%
the regulation, see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
235. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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treated because of the viewpoint expressed. What the Court has held is
that commercial speech is protected, but that there are common sense
differences between it and other types of protected speech that permit
greater regulation of commercial speech.
2 3 6
The Court has permitted the regulation of commercial speech on
bases that would be impermissible if other types of speech were in-
volved. The Court's reason for according less protection to commercial
speech has not been to allow states to promote any particular viewpoint,
but instead to "insur[e] that the stream of commercial information
flow[s] clearly as well as freely." 2 3 7 Virginia Pharmacy, as the progenitor
of modern commercial cases, is particularly helpful in revealing what the
Court sought to accomplish by extending first amendment protection to
commercial speech. Virginia's rationale for prohibiting the advertise-
ment of prescription prices was its concern for continued competition
and professionalism among pharmacists. 23 8 These interests, however,
were considered too attentuated from the method chosen to accomplish
them. The Court rejected Virginia's contention that suppressing the ad-
vertising of prescription prices would directly advance the asserted goals
and do so without unduly restricting protected speech.2 3 9 A similar dis-
belief by the Court in the connection between the asserted interest and
the method chosen to further it resulted in the invalidation of attorney
advertising restrictions in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.
2 40
In Linmark Association, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,24 1 the Court in-
validated an ordinance that prohibited "for sale" signs. The township
tried to distinguish its ordinance from the Virginia Pharmacy restriction
on the basis of the important goal of preventing panic selling in neigh-
borhoods undergoing racial integration.2 42 The Court rejected the con-
tention that such a ban was needed to advance the goal of racially stable
neighborhoods. 24 3 Instead of attacking the problem directly, the town-
ship chose to further its goal by reducing information available about
the problem; a method the Court found to be unconstitutional. 
2 4 4
Thus, pursuit of an interest as strong and admirable as racial integration
was insufficient to permit the township to choose the highly paternalistic
regulatory practice of reducing the amount of information available
when there existed other means to remedy the problem.
2 45
Linmark, Bates and Virginia Pharmacy underlie three of the four parts
of the Central Hudson test. These cases recognize that commercial speech
236. E.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-62; Bates v. State Bar of Arizona. 433 U.S.
350, 381 (1977).
237. ,irginia Pharmac,, 425 U.S. at 772.
238. Id. at 766-68.
239. Id. at 678-70.
240. 433 U.S. 350, 364-79. Six reasons for the advertising restriction were examined
and rejected by the court as insufficient to justify the ban.
241. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
242. Id. at 94.
243. Id. at 95-97.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 97.
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may be regulated when necessary to further a substantial state interest.
More importantly, however, they are cases in which regulations were in-
validated because they did not "directly advance the state interest ' 2 4 6 or
unnecessarily impaired free expression.
24 7
From the specific fact patterns and the holdings in the three afore-
mentioned cases, the Central Hudson test emerged. 2 4 8 However, the im-
portant distinction between regulations which in the process of further-
ing a substantive state goal, tangentially interfere with speech and those
that further the goal by direct suppression of speech was lost in the
transformation of the holdings of Linmark, Bates and Virginia Pharmacy
into a test of general applicability. For example, in Virginia Pharmacy the
Court invalidated the prohibition against advertising prescription prices
because there was no direct link between the goals of promoting compe-
tition and professionalism among pharmacists and the inability to adver-
tise. 2 4 9 In Central Hudson, however, the Court weakened the holdings of
all prior commercial speech cases by not discussing the availability to the
state of other means to accomplish its substantial state interest in energy
conservation. Although the Court reemphasized that speech restrictions
must be confined to methods which are the least restrictive, it concen-
trated its discussion on other, less restrictive ways of regulating speech
instead of methods unrelated to speech regulation. 2 50 Because it gener-
alized from prior holdings, Central Hudson produced a test that allows a
state to chose a regulatory scheme that focuses on the content of com-
mercial speech as long as the scheme is the least restrictive of the possi-
ble speech restrictions.2 5 1 This startling, though subtle, shift permits a
state to control not only subject matter, but also the speaker's viewpoint,
provided that the regulation is the least restrictive of the speech-restric-
tive methods of furthering the state's interest.
2 52
Although Justice Blackmun concurred in invalidating the regula-
tion, he authored a separate opinion to express, in part, his concern
about the Court's apparent willingness to allow a state to deprive its
citizens of information in order to influence their behavior. 25 3 Justice
Blackmun noted that:
Our prior references to the "commonsense differences"
between commercial speech and other speech "suggest that a
different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the
flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is
unimpaired." . . . We have not suggested that "commonsense
differences" between commercial speech and other speech jus-
tify relaxed scrutiny of restraints that suppress truthful,
246. This was the case in Bates and Virginia Pharmacy. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
247. This was part of the reason the Linmark regulation was invalidated. Limiark, 431
U.S. at 96-97; Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 701-02 (1977).
248. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-66.
249. lirginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769-80.
250. Central Hludson, 447 U.S. at 569-71.
251. See id. at 578-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 577.
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nondeceptive, noncoercive commercial speech. The differ-
ences articulated by the Court . . .justify a more permissive
approach to regulation of the manner of commercial speech for
the purpose of protecting consumers from deception or coer-
cion . . . . No differences between commercial speech and
other protected speech justify suppression of commercial
speech in order to influence public conduct through manipula-
tion of the availability of information.
2 54
Justice Blackmun's attack on the Court's apparent willingness to uphold
a ban on the advertising of inefficient air conditioning units when no less
restrictive speech regulation existed to further the state's goal of reduc-
ing energy consumption is justified because such a direct viewpoint re-
striction of commercial speech is unprecedented. 25 5 Consequently, the
Fifth Circuit followed the Central Hudson test and nonetheless reached an
absolutely incorrect result in Dunagin.
There are three levels on which Dunagin should be examined for
theoretical and practical soundness. The first involves a return to the
equality and nondistortion interests to ask whether the restriction is one
that should be subjected to strict scrutiny. If the restriction does dam-
age either of these interests and affects commercial speech, the next in-
quiry is to determine whether the Central Hudson test is satisfied. Lastly,
it must be asked whether the distinction set forth in Dunagin between
commercial speech and other types of protected speech is workable:
Can commercial speech be reasonably distinguished from non-commer-
cial speech in order to permit the application of otherwise impermissible
viewpoint restrictions to commercial speech?
Dunagin is a classic example of a restriction violative of both the
equality and nondistortion interests. By severely restricting liquor ad-
vertising, Mississippi unabashedly expressed favoritism for one side of
the debate on liquor sales and consumption and also furthered its an-
nounced policy of reducing liquor consumption. 25 6 Rather than explic-
itly require its citizens to stop drinking, the state chose instead to reduce
their drinking by making it more difficult to make reasonable economic
choices about where to buy liquor and what type to buy. The state chose
regulation over prohibition and reformation.
A "compelling state interest" standard of review would have been
254. Id. at 578.
255. One court has accepted this position as articulated by Justice Blackmun. In Michi-
gan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Ass'n v. Attorney General, 370 N.W.2d 328 (Mich. App.
1985), the Michigan Court of Appeals invalidated regulations of the Liquor Control Com-
mission that were intended to discourage the artifical stimulation of liquor consumption.
Id. at 335-36. The court did an admirable job of wading through the interests advanced by
the Commission to conclude that liquor consumption was not likely to be artificially stimt-
lated by price advertisements where brand advertisements are permitted. The court also
concluded, without analysis, that police power interests, however important. do nut justil"
speech regulation in the absence of a real and substantial relationship between the per-
sonal fireedom impinged and the interest to be fturthered. Instead of suggesting that there
were regulatory ineasurcs available that were less restrictive than speech regulation. the
court relied onjustice Blackmtin's conclusion and the absence ol'a substantial finlherance
of ile state's interest by the regulations. Id. at 336-37.
256. Dittta'gi. 718 F.2d at 740-42.
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applied in Dunagin, but for the fact that the speech was commercial.2 57
Because commercial advertising was the subject of the restriction, the
court was correct in applying the Central Hudson test. The test does not
require a compelling state interest. A state need only show that its regu-
lation furthers a substantial state interest, 258 directly advances the state
interest and is not unnecessarily restrictive of speech. 259
There is little doubt that an advertising ban would directly serve the
state's interest in reducing liquor consumption, regardless of whether
the state interest is characterized as the reduction of all liquor consump-
tion or only the reduction of the artificial stimulation of such consump-
tion.2 60 Because of the near hypocritical ambivalence that pervades a
state regulatory scheme that permits drinking in some areas, but not in
others, it is difficult to accept the state's argument that there exists a
substantial state interest. Instead of facing the politically difficult and
probably impractical choice of continuing the statewide prohibition, the
state chose to discourage consumption by requiring local governmental
units to vote affirmatively for the legalization of drinking, while concur-
rently restricting liquor advertising even in those areas where it could
legally be sold.
Although courts should generally defer to legislative judgments
about the existence of a substantial state interest in matters affecting
public health and welfare, in situations where a state may choose be-
tween the prohibition of an activity and a regulatory scheme that impairs
free expression, courts ought to carefully scrutinize the authenticity of
the state's declared substantial interest.
Closely related to the question of the presence of a substantial state
interest is the question of how invasive of first amendment interests a
regulation may be in furtherance of the state's goals. If a state's interest
is in curbing the artificial stimulation of consumption, then there should
be an inquiry into whether there are types of liquor advertisements
which do not artificially stimulate consumption. 2 6 1 Although there was
conflicting evidence in Dunagin on this issue,2 62 the Fifth Circuit did not
bother to differentiate between types of advertising on the basis of
whether they were likely or unlikely to stimulate artificial
257. See id. at 747.
258. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. There is no doubt that the regulation of this type
of speech is permissible. See Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 743. There certainly exists a substantial
state interest in discouraging alcohol consumption. Had the state prohibited the sale and
drinking of alcohol, it would have expressed this legitimate concern. The authenticity of
its concern, however, is questionable where the state determines that there is a problem
involving the sale and drinking of alcohol, but does not take the obvious step of prohibit-
ing the sale and drinking of alcohol.
259. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
260. l'he Court does not ocus on either interest to the exclusion of the other. Both
are legitimate because any reduction would help to relieve the serious problems associated
with liquor consumption . See Dunqgin, 718 F.2d at 747-48.
261. Ihere was evidence at the trial that most advertising did nothing more than allecl





Because commercial speech provides important information to con-
sumers, it should not be without protection. 2 6 4 Although commercial
speech is subject to regulation, the Court has held that such regulation
must be based on content and not on commercialism. 2 6 5 The commer-
cial speech doctrine permits a greater degree of regulation of commer-
cial versus non-commercial speech in order to ensure that states
continue to fulfill their traditional role as guardians of the marketplace.
In this capacity, a state may regulate commercial speech to the extent
necessary to prevent illegality, fraud and deception, 2" 6 but may not pa-
ternalistically choose what is and is not worth hearing. 26 7 When the
choice is between free access to information and the suppression of
commercial speech, to further a substantial state interest that could be
accomplished by means other than suppression the state should permit
unrestricted access to information and further its substantial interest by
other means.
26 8
Because of the serious infringement of the equality and nondistor-
tion values, the ambivalent. commitment to a goal evidenced by the fail-
ure to directly advance the purported state interest and the availability
of methods that do not impair free speech, the Dunagin regulation and
others like it should fail constitutional muster. This may be obtained by
strengthening the fourth part of the Central Hudson test as follows: The
method chosen to accomplish the goal must be such as would be chosen
by a reasonable legislature to accomplish its goal with the least possible
damage to first amendment interests. Under this test, if the goal were to
reduce liquor consumption, a large tax on liquor, its rationing or a flat
prohibition on its consumption would accomplish that goal without in-
fringing first amendment interests.
Under the test established in Central Hudson and applied in Dunagin,
states not only may distinguish between messages on the basis of com-
mercial subject matter, but also may promote their own interests by reg-
ulating the viewpoints expressed, suppressing those messages
inconsistent with the state interest being promoted. The Fifth Circuit
was unperturbed by this possibility because advertisements in the ab-
stract are clearly commercial and the restrictions at issue furthered the
substantial state interest of reducing liquor consumption. 2'- Courts in
general, however, should be concerned with such viewpoint restrictions
in cases where it is unclear whether the speech to be restricted is com-
263. The prohibition also included billboards that did nothing more ihan give an ad-
dress, the name of the product and a price in black and white print. Ju[st asJustice Harlan
had observed in Cohen v. California. 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971), that it was improbable that
[here existed any prurient interest in the )hrase "Fuck the draft." it is dillicul I0 believe
that such a plain annotucement would artificially stimulate consumption.
264. Se' I 'ni Phia Iarcy, 425 U.S. at 765.
265. Id. at 761-62.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 770.
268. IdS a/e o Central ludt d . 447 U.S. at 576-78 (Blackunii, .. onturiing)
269. Dunagi,. 718 F.2d at 750-51.
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mercial or non-commercial. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, it
is often difficult to differentiate between commercial and non-commer-
cial messages. 2 70 The problems associated with making this difficult dis-
tinction in a manner which does not seriously infringe first amendment
values has only recently been seriously addressed. 2 7 1 Suffice it to say
that any rule that relies on distinguishing commercial speech from other
types of protected speech likely will be problematic. 27 2 For this reason,
testing restrictions that damage the equality and nondistortion values by
a standard less stringent than the "compelling state interest" test, solely
because the speech is commercial, does not promote the development
of a more coherent theory of first amendment protection.
A recent Nevada case provides an excellent example of a state regu-
lation that comports with this article's thesis. In Princess Sea Industries v.
State,2 7 3 a brothel owner and two newspaper publishers challenged a
Nevada law prohibiting advertisements for brothels in those areas of the
state where brothels are illegal.2 74 Thus, the regulation in this case
bears similarities to the regulation in Dunagin, because prostitution in
Nevada, as liquor sales and consumption in Mississippi, is legal only in
some areas of the state.2 75 The Nevada regulation is distinguishable
from the Mississippi regulation, however, in that the advertising of pros-
titution is prohibited only where the prostitution is itself illegal, thereby
leaving brothel owners free to advertise in those counties where prosti-
tution is legal.
2 76
Nevada's ambivalence in regulating prostitution is much less prob-
lematic than Mississippi's ambivalence in regulating liquor sales and
consumption because Nevada prohibited speech promoting prostitution
only where such activity was illegal. 2 77 Thus, where prostitution was an
illegal activity, Nevada legitimately exercised its right to prohibit adver-
tising that could promote such unlawful conduct in order to counteract
the substantial danger that local prohibitions of prositution would
thereby be violated. 2 78 The Nevada regulation is an example of a com-
mercial speech regulation that does not damage the equality and nondis-
tortion values because it does not attempt to affect public behavior by
regulating speech about prostitution in those areas where it is an argua-
270. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 538-39 (Brennan, J.. concurring); V'iginia Pha rmacy, 425
U.S. at 764-65. See generally Barnes, supra note 2; Comment, Conimercial Speech: .4 Proposed
Definilion. 27 How. L.J. 1015 (1984).
271. See Barnes, supra note 2, at 476-93.
272. See id. at 490-93. But see Comment, supra note 267, at 1027-30.
273. 97 Nev. 534, 635 P.2d 281 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982).
274. Id. at 282.
275. Id. at 284 (Manoukian, j., concurring).
276. See id. Prostitution is not permitted in Clark County where L.as Vegas and a large
portion of' Nevada's tourist business is located. 1d.
277. Id. at 284 (Manoukian, j., concurring).
278. Id. at 285 (Manoukian, J., concurring). See also Virginia iharmacy. 425 U.S. al 771-
72; Barnes, supra note 2, at 498-506. Because the advertising of a comnnercial activity
indicates that there is a willing seller who is able to sell and there has been communicated
inlformation about an unlawihl activity, which requires only an acceptance, such expression
presents a "clear and present danger" of a violation of substantive stl e law prohibiting
the advertised activity. Barnes. supra note 2. at 498-506.
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bly undesirable, but otherwise lawful activity. 2 79
CONCLUSION
Underlying the application of the "compelling state interest" test
may be a concern for damage to the neutrality and nondistortion inter-
ests. When neither of these two factors are present, the less stringent
"reasonable regulation" standard of review should be applied. Regula-
tions that focus on the content of speech, such as those that are applica-
ble only to commercial speech, are subject-matter restrictions that
damage at least one, and probably both, of the above mentioned inter-
ests. Therefore, these regulations can not be justified by simply classify-
ing them as neutral time, place and manner restrictions.
The application of the intermediate "substantial state interest" test
to commercial speech has led to the anomalous treatment of regulations
that infringe on commercial speech promoting harmful or undesirable,
but lawful activities. This article suggests that to accommodate both the
state interest in regulating harmful or undesirable speech and the first
amendment interest in the protection of expression, the Central Hudson
test should be modified to require the state to choose the method a rea-
sonable legislature would choose to accomplish the substantive goal
without infringing free expression. Thus, the least restrictive alternative
requirement would require that a state legislature attempt to directly reg-
ulate the purported harmful or undesirable activity before it may regu-
late speech about that activity. A state should not be permitted to
manipulate behavior to reduce or eliminate harmful or undesirable con-
duct by reducing information about such conduct when that conduct has
not been directly regulated.
279. Speech regulation intended to affect substantive behavior does not require that in
all cases there be a prohibition of the underlying conduct. Instead, this type of regulation
should invoke the compelling state interest analysis. Thus, if the underlying conduct pro-
posed by the speech is lawful, there must be a compelling state interest directly furthered
by the speech regulation and that interest must be impossible to achieve by a means less
restrictive of speech. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n. 436 U.S. 447 (1978), Ohralik was
suspended from the practice of law for face-to-face solicitation of two women, who had
been injured in an accident, to be his clients. Id. at 467-68. Although the underlying
transaction of providing legal services was lawful and the regulation of the solicitation was
not aimed at affecting that transaction, the regulation was intended to regulate such com-
mercial transactions to prevent fraud, overreaching, misrepresentation, the debasement of
the legal profession, and the instigation of unnecessary litigation. Id. at 461. Thus articu-
lated, it is apparent that the regulation of the manner in which an attorney communicates
the availability of legal services not only serves these compelling state interests, but is also
the least restrictive of those methods that may interfere with speech. For example, punish-
ing the conduct after the fact would not prevent the substantive harm because even in the
best of circumstances it would only redress it. Note that in the instant context the evils
flow from the communication, not the conduct. This is not the case when the advertising
encourages the evil, but is not the evil, such as in the case of the advertising of liquor or
prostitution.
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